Ici et ailleurs

Why does the West contain China ? It is not to defend values, but to maintain privileges

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado — 2024-07-31T05:00:00Z

If we examine political or journalistic accounts from the West, we find a virtually homogeneous voice claiming that the aggressive “Communist” China represents the most serious threat to the “rules-based international order.” Our leaders claim that the rise of China is harming the working class, taking away our jobs, stealing our technology, and manipulating markets to take all the money, leaving us with nothing.

How true are these arguments ? What are the real underlying reasons that feed the “China threat” narrative ? I will advance my argument now : 1) The crux of this narrative is not the threat to values but the relative loss of privileges of some groups (mainly white men, but not only) in the West and the countries of the Global North. 2) Our elites blame China's behavior or intentions to divert our attention from their own actions, which are driving our countries into relative decline vis-à-vis China.

First. Democracy is at risk if we let China become more powerful, our leaders say. This is false for two obvious reasons. First, there is no threat to the democratic international order because it is not democratic to begin with : it is a hierarchical one, dominated by the US and its allies in the Global North for decades—or rather centuries. Second, while we could claim that “democracy” at home, in the liberal democracies of the Global North, is at risk, how is Xi Jinping to blame for this ? Is it not figures like Donald Trump, Orban, or Le Pen who pose the most serious threat to democracy ? For those on the left, this might seem clear, but it is not so obvious for large segments of our societies today.

Internationally, the extraordinary growth of China has demonstrated that countries do not need to be democratic to be innovative and have efficient markets. We were not rich due to our purportedly superior values and “free markets.” We were rich due to historical privileges emerging from centuries of colonialism, geography, war, and a good amount of luck. We imposed free trade on others who could not compete with us due to their subordination. And because we were rich and privileged, we could afford the discourse of democracy at home while doing the opposite abroad : who was going to challenge us ? Our global dominance allowed us to thrive in ways difficult to imagine in other parts of the world. How could we now talk about international “democracy” if the core of this concept is equality ?

No, what we fear is not the loss of our values, because if you don't like them, we always have others. What we fear is that China might one day be in our shoes and treat us as we treated others in the past. After a long era of imposing open markets on other countries, now that we feel relatively subordinated to China's prowess, we don't want free trade anymore but protectionism. Capitalism (neoliberal globalist capitalism) was cool while we were the ones having the cake and eating it too. “Communist” China has won at the game of capitalism within the US-led order. We feel ashamed to admit that China might have done things well and worked hard, deserving to be “number one,” so we come up with bad-loser excuses.

For example, let's talk about the so-called “overcapacity” of China's electric vehicle industry. The West claims that Chinese factories produce more than Chinese consumers can buy. But this is false compared to Western brands like Volkswagen, Ford, or Toyota. In 2023, Japan produced almost 9 million cars and exported almost 6 million. Germany produced 4.1 million cars and exported 3.1 million. Japan and Germany consume only 33% and 25% of the cars they produce, respectively. In contrast, China produced 30.1 million cars and exported 5.2 million, selling 83% of the cars domestically. So, who has the industrial overcapacity ? The real reason behind this charade is that the Global North does not want people to start buying better and cheaper Chinese cars, leaving their brands with unsold overproduction.

Not only electric cars but also solar panels are under sanctions due to accusations of overcapacity and state subsidies (as if Western countries do not subsidize “green technologies”). Wasn't saving the planet the main goal ? It seems clear that Western democracies have chosen to save their industries over saving the planet. Instead of receiving Chinese green technology with open arms and thanking them for their industrial and technological effort that could benefit the whole planet, we find ourselves in a trade war to selfishly make a last attempt to keep our economic primacy.

Second. China “the thief” and China “the manipulator,” our leaders repeatedly claim. I do not deny that China has done everything in its power to thrive under Western domination. China played against the rules, but how can we blame it ? Western countries have been stealing and playing dirty since day one. It is not China that stole “our” jobs ; it is Western capitalists who moved their industries abroad in search of more profits. It is not China that forced foreign companies to cede their intellectual property ; it was these companies that agreed because they wanted to make money. Our old economies have survived on cheap Chinese goods and China's purchase of our increasing debts. The US debt is at unprecedented levels and growing, and the fall from this will make the 2008 financial crisis feel like a child's tale.

But most of our fellow citizens believe that if things are tough, it is because of China's malice. This belief is fueled by far-right politicians who blame three enemies for the destruction of our societies : the elites, immigrants, and China. This narrative has persuaded many people and made the elites nervous. As a result, the elites ride the wave and divert attention to China. Mainstream parties have not fully bought the rationale against immigration, but they have embraced the argument that China is the perfect external enemy.

The real “invisible” problem is the West's incapacity to accept the end of white men's world dominance. While the West enjoyed a position of dominance and the perks that came with it, we could maintain the facade of democracy's supremacy and how wonderful free trade was. At home, democracy has lasted because people remained broadly optimistic about the future and accepted the political show that went from election to election while the world evolved, leaving us aside. But that is quickly changing.

The issue of the crazy prices of housing is somewhat connected to this : since we cannot compete with China's industry, technology, innovation, and logistics, capital is turning to tourism and housing for easy returns, creating another bubble and sacrificing millions of workers in the process. Those who own real estate can still live moderately well, but those who don't are experiencing a new era of semi-slavery : working to survive. Add to this the damaging social media instilling in us the need to constantly show off, and people spend more than they have, drowning in debt. Many people affected by the cost-of-living crisis see our economies for what they are : systems in decline. It does not matter what GDP figures show ; the personal vibes are negative, and people are pissed off even if they are not directly affected yet (I am okay, but the country is going to hell, they often say). GDP might grow, but the money of that growth goes only to a few pockets. Therefore, people vote for “saviors” that promise to make the country great again, elevating nostalgia of the colonial past. These saviors make immigrants and China the enemy but are still careful with their own capitalists and their system, who enjoyed the benefits of neoliberal globalization while leaving the country only wearing the underwear.

This emerging disparity between the rentier economies of the West, driven by financialisation and short-termism, and the more productive economy of China, which can design long-term plans unbothered by election cycles, drives people to support politicians who promise to contain Beijing rather than address the underlying issue : the need to shift our economic priorities. By reducing the cost of living and ensuring that residents can thrive rather than merely survive, we could build a more equitable and sustainable future for all, even if our GDP was lower, thus lessening international resentment against those who have learned to excel at our own economic game. Unfortunately, the measures chosen are militarism and protectionism aimed at containing China, which, besides being ineffective, only increase inflation, worsening the cost of living and harming those with lower incomes and no housing of their own. Not to mention the costs of increasing militarism that are leading us to a potential future “hot” war.

Now that the West does not enjoy its uncontested position of dominance over the rest, we can see how anti-democratic forces bloom throughout the “democratic West.” For large shares of Westerners today, it does not seem to matter whether we are liberal democracies or something else, as long as “we” remain in primacy (Make America Great Again). The case of Trump is the most obvious one because he openly talks about maintaining global primacy above anything else, no matter what has to be done to achieve it. For them, China becomes the main threat not to our values or our security, as it is commonly described in politically correct language, but to our global privileges.

A funny story : When I lived in China between 2011 and 2013, I asked some Chinese young people their opinion about the CCP “dictatorship” and they said : they are corrupt, yes, but as long as the economy goes well and the future looks bright, it is alright. This was difficult for me to understand at the time ; perhaps I was still affected by Western supremacism, believing that our culture was inherently better and we would never accept something like that. Now, of course, I see that the same applies to us here in the West. We are not different after all : the majority in our society wants prosperity and other issues are secondary. Our self-image of superior values is being dismantled by ourselves when we are faced with the need to accept that we will be number two. Better destruction and injustice than passing the crown...

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

A Call to End the Rentist Economy (to Avoid War with China…)

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado — 2024-07-16T05:00:00Z

Málaga, renowned for its stunning beaches and rich cultural heritage, is facing a severe housing crisis fuelled by the surge in tourist rentals. Recently, residents took to the streets in protest, holding signs such as “Málaga to live, not to survive”, “I don't want to be an extra in my city”, “Ban tourist housing”, “There's no water for so many tourists”, “Housing is a right, not a business”, and “Our rent = your payout”. These messages underscore the struggle for affordable housing as rental prices soar.

The root of the problem is the rentist economy, which prioritizes short-term rental profits over long-term housing needs. Málaga has the third highest number of tourist rental properties in Spain, despite its smaller population compared to Madrid and Barcelona. Reliance on property rentals creates precarious labour conditions, where wages fail to keep up with housing costs. This situation traps workers in a cycle of working merely to pay the bills (i.e., modern slavery), with little hope of improving their living conditions. Young people are particularly affected, with the probability of buying a home virtually nonexistent without family support. This exacerbates social inequalities, creating a divide between families of “wealthy homeowners” and “working-class renters”.

The problem of the rentist economy brings with it broader issues. For example, the influx of tourists strains local resources, as highlighted by the protest slogan “There's no water for so many tourists”, emphasizing water scarcity exacerbated by high tourist demand in an area already suffering from serious water deficits and increasing droughts due to climate change. Moreover, heavy investment by financial funds in the rental economy artificially inflates prices, making it more difficult for individual workers to compete in the market against these economic giants. And a lot of the income generated by tourist rentals (and even normal rentals) goes abroad to international investors, leaving nothing in the country. The high profit of this rentist economy also deprives other crucial sectors of the economy of investment, making Spain (and other Western economies that face similar problems) more dependent on tourism and less competitive against economies prioritizing industry or technology, such as China.

As a result of unproductive over-investment in the new real estate bubble, Western economies struggle, and the cost of living becomes increasingly burdensome for workers. Our governments and capital have not only failed to learn from the 2008 crisis but are exacerbating the problem by adding tourist rentals into the mix. No wonder large segments of society are highly discontented. This growing disparity between the rentist economies of the West and the more productive economies of countries like China drives people to support politicians who promise to contain immigration or China, rather than addressing the real underlying issue : the need to shift our economic priorities. By reducing the cost of living and economic inequality, and ensuring that residents can thrive rather than merely survive, we could build a more equitable and sustainable future for all, and lessen international resentment against external “others”.

Unfortunately, the measures chosen so far are purely reactionary : militarism and protectionism aimed at containing perceived “enemies” like China, which besides being ineffective, only increases inflation, once again raising the cost of living and harming those with lower incomes. Not to mention the unbearable costs of increasing militarism and a future “hot” war… Hopefully, platforms like Airbnb will be forbidden in the short term, following initiatives like those planned in the cities of New York and Barcelona and the ones recently demanded in Málaga.

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

Extracts - Treasure Island

Alain Brossat, Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado — 2022-12-15T11:42:07Z

PART I – The Language of Hegemony

To resist within language. Alain Brossat

To eradicate the Culture of the Enemy. Alain Brossat

PART II – A War of Words : The Construction of the Anti-China Narrative

The Schmittian turn of Global Democracy. Alain Brossat

A pandemic of Sinophobia. Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

What is happening in Xinjiang ? An epistemological challenge. Alain Brossat and Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

“Large Space” and the New Cold War. Alain Brossat

PART III – The Effects of the New Cold War in the Taiwan Strait

The thorny issue of Taiwanese sovereignty. Alain Brossat

Taiwan as a field of disinformation. Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

The little soldiers of the new Cold War in East Asia. Alain Brossat

Taiwan in a comparative perspective : is it Gibraltar, Switzerland, or Ukraine ? Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

Quarantine as soft prisoning (room 703). Alain Brossat

How war fall on us. Alain Brossat and Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

[Book available HERE or on demand at this adress : juanalbertocasado[@]gmail.com]

Extracts

3
The Schmittian turn of Global Democracy

Alain Brossat

After the decisive victories of Stalingrad on the Russian front, Al Alamein in the desert war, in North Africa, and Guadalcanal and Midway on the Asian front, the Allies had good reasons for banking on a defeat of the Axis and consider a future with victory colours. From the second half of 1943 to the announced collapse of Nazi Germany and then of Japan, there were plenty of meetings and conferences that brought Allied leaders together : the Cairo conference brought together Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek (November 1943), the Tehran conference brought together Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill (November-December 1943), the Moscow conference (preceded by three other meetings in the Soviet capital) where Soviet, British, American and Polish delegations (representing the two competing Polish governments, in exile) met in October 1944, the Yalta conference with Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill (February 1945) and finally, after the German surrender, the Potsdam Conference with Churchill and then Attlee, Truman and Stalin (July-August 1945).
During these meetings, the Allied leaders discussed the future of Germany, and more vaguely the conditions that would be imposed on defeated Japan (the Soviets only declared war on Japan after the German surrender). For the most part, the main object of their common concerns was constant : what would the post-war period look like in terms of the respective influences of the two major components of the Allied coalition, the United States and Great Britain on the one hand, the Soviet Union on the other – each of the two parties embodying a political system principally incompatible with the other – and nevertheless condemned to active collaboration during the years of the war.
In practice, whether surreptitiously or explicitly, the motive that haunted these meetings, inseparable from the anticipation of victory over the Axis, was that of zones of influence ; variable geometry, differently assessed according to the temperament and convictions of the protagonists (Churchill, viscerally anti-Communist and anti-Soviet anticipated the Cold War, just like de Gaulle, a secondary protagonist of these debates ; Roosevelt was more confident in the future of a cordial understanding with Stalin's USSR), sometimes cynically expressed in terms of percentages, with a pencil in hand, sometimes more vaguely when the interests of one side or the other clash too directly.
In any case, concerning both Europe and East Asia (the rest of the world was almost entirely ignored, until the San Francisco conference at which the victors laid the groundwork for the UN), a guideline appeared here, on which all parties clearly agreed : the war efforts made by both sides within the framework of the victorious coalition must, in the post-war period, be continued on the ground. The power relations that had been established between allies, and as these allies embodied mainly antagonistic political systems, must find their outlet in the form of distributions inscribed in the territories and the life of the peoples. The Allies fought against Nazi Germany as the latter availed itself of the right of conquest, revoked as barbarian. For this reason, the former must invent a codification of the main reason for sharing and distribution that will enable them to avoid appearing purely and simply as conquering victors – hence the success of the keyword of “zones of influence” – Stalin did not annex Poland, Greece would not be explicitly an Anglo-American protectorate, but the key idea is there : Europe was doomed to become the body on which the balance of power between the two allied and antagonistic powers would be inscribed.

The rest is known, even if, on the field, it took quite a different turn from the general figures outlined by the leaders of the coalition during their various meetings. The notion of divide/sharing without conquests or annexations strictly speaking – with the exception of some border rectifications and, on the Asian front, of the annexation by the USSR of part of Sakhalin and the Kurils, without forgetting the de facto restitution of Formosa (Taiwan) to China – was the basic idea which governed the production of the geopolitical configuration of the post-war period in Europe and, more unstably, in East Asia (the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the first act of the Cold War, shows this sufficiently) : the zones of influence were emerging quickly in Europe, with the formation of the Soviet glacis in Eastern Europe ; the crushing of the popular movement resulting from the resistance animated by the Communists in Greece ; Germany was divided into two zones destined to become two separate state entities, one placed under Western influence and the other Soviet ; Japan became a US protectorate, etc.

The question I would like to focus on here is the following : how do we pass, (in the perspective of the Western powers and first and foremost the United States) from a topos, from a discursive register in which the notion of divide/sharing with an ally (a friend – Stalin “Uncle Joe”, in US propaganda throughout the war) who is also intrinsically an enemy (of yesterday and tomorrow – the embodiment of communist evil, of a totalitarian ideology, to such an extent that even staunch anti-Communists like Churchill or de Gaulle could not question the strategy, even if they did doubt that this division could find stability and be based on a balance) – how do we pass, then, from this system of evidence to the one that has prevailed for several decades now and which relies on such different axioms ?
According to the most recent system, for the Western powers (first and foremost the United States, again) any notion of divide/sharing with a political system declared incompatible with “democracy” and embodied, henceforth, by an ascending power, China, would be heresy and forfeiture. The only conceivable historical horizon, for the immediate present and the distant future, is the democratisation of the world, a political globalization and normalization placed under the exclusive sign of liberal democracy.
The question within the question would be whether or to what extent this contrast is soluble in the historical conditions – can it be reduced purely and simply to the contrast between historical situations that are so different from each other ? War, and especially a conflict like the Second World War, is, was a merciless indicator of power struggles : the Allied landings in Normandy and Sicily and then in Provence were certainly successful, but the Soviet Army was progressing rapidly in eastern Germany when the Americans were still embroiled in the Battle of the Bulge. Of course, Stalin and Churchill put their signatures on a sheet of paper on which was scrawled : “Yugoslavia 50/50”, but on the ground, it is the partisans of Tito and not the Chetniks who really challenged the Wehrmacht… The military balance of power on the ground dictates the fate of the powers engaged in combat, including those on the winning side : it shapes the post-war geopolitical landscape in the most constraining way possible.
This is one of the effects of modern total war, in contrast to the dynastic wars of the Ancien Régime : it is not sovereigns who are fighting over disputed territories, it is worlds which are clashing – when the conflict ends, it is not only a few border lines that have been altered, it is the fate of the peoples that has radically changed. The balance of power established during the war, by force of arms, draws the unsurpassable horizon of the post-war period – the domination that the USSR exercised over Eastern Europe having driven out the Wehrmacht (the meeting between Soviet troops and US troops took place on the Elbe, on German soil) is not open for discussion, diplomacy can only endorse the results obtained on the ground.

But what is immediately noticeable at the same time is this : these elements of reality, at the very moment when they outline the unsurpassable horizon of statesmen and politicians' actions, are converted into principles, rules of conduct and matrices of thought – into schemes of political rationality, into the basis of political strategies. It is here that the amphibology of the French term partage reveals all its resources : the notion of dividing (Europe and potentially the planet) into “areas of influence” becomes an idea of sharing, that is to say the diagram (the inscription surface) in which the allies of yesterday and the adversaries of tomorrow (from the configuration of the Second World War to that of the Cold War) are both found circumscribed, despite everything that opposes them. What holds attention in this figure is the way in which partage, as in divide (what opposes, separates), is the object of a sharing (what we have in common, in share). In a sense the unique feature of the Cold War was organized around this amphibology – being a war with multiple episodes, some of which are very violent and armed (the Korean War which inaugurated it and the Vietnam War which heralds its fading away, passing through the blockade of Berlin and a number of memorable episodes) and which, however, did not globalize, intensify or generalize nuclear confrontation in the post-Hiroshima-Nagasaki world.
It is therefore blatant that what acts as a moderating principle in the conflicts between the two superpowers that clashed through their respective allies and subordinates, is the regulatory idea of partage – divide and sharing – or, in other words, the idea according to which the zones of influence remained, in the very configuration of the Cold War, an idea of political reason, a regulatory principle – which explains why the Western powers placed under US hegemony abstain from intervening in the major political crises that occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1956, that the rocket crisis in Cuba (1962) was resolved without armed confrontation, and that the Soviets (and even the Chinese) did not intervene directly in the Vietnamese conflict, etc.

Throughout the Cold War, including its moments of greatest tension, the notion of partage (in the sense of what separates, divides) between what is apologetically designated as the “free world” and what is its opposite remains an idea of political reason. The West must, in one way or another, coexist with the great political, ideological, civilizational Other, designated by the master signifier “communism” (“Soviet totalitarianism” in its pejorative name). At the time when the Cold War was ending and the rise of the motif of Peaceful Coexistence, driven in particular by Khrushchev, this notion even found a resurgence of strength, visibility and hold over the minds of those in power as well as those governed. During the Cold War, even the most committed of politicians and intellectuals in the crusade against communism were not animated by the phantasmagoria of a complete democratization of the planet ; their dream was to contain and rollback the reds, of communism, in all its forms and states, which is quite different – the proof being that they were ready to arouse and support bloody tyrannies, military dictatorships, touted as ramparts against the red peril – from Suharto to Pinochet and so many others. In this era, even the most frenzied crusaders of Western democracy remained sensitive to the motive of political otherness, of difference : in order to suppress communism in the world, Western democracies could not do without intermediary “useful” dictatorships and tyrannies.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China in 1979 clearly showed that soon after the interminable and disastrous Vietnam War, intended to block the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia (at least, this is what the narrators of the “free world” say), the spirit of the camp retained this turn inherited from the Second World War. The perpetual struggle against the other camp, the opposing camp, paradoxically implies its recognition and, what is more, the recognition of its full political otherness : it is indeed with Communist China, the China resulting from the Chinese Revolution, the China of Mao that the ultra-reactionary Nixon has chosen to contract, by inaugurating this new era in which China becomes a full member of the international community. Great Britain and France had long shown the way (1950 and 1964 respectively).
This well-known sequence placed under the sign of Realpolitik, from the Western point of view, shows how foreign, in this historical configuration, the very notion of an infinite democratization of the world remained to the strategists and ideologists of Western democracies : they had to acknowledge that difference and division did exist, they are components of the global political arena, communism as the irreducible great Other of Western democracy (or Western way democracy, as in Japan), or, in the theological-political terms cultivated by the great providentialist narrative of American democracy, a tenacious figure of political evil – the figure of the enemy, by contrast with all those other figures of evil, relative and necessary, that are the tyrannies and military regimes armed and supported by the Western powers, beginning with the United States – friends, political friends, clients, proxies, subalterns…

In other words, in this world of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, we were in a configuration where mechanisms and processes of recognition remained active, over and over again – infinitely contrasted, tense, exposed – but never denied or disabled in the face of crises and political challenges. The mode of relations between camps and in particular between the two superpowers grappling at the time the (supposed) equilibrium of nuclear forces (known as the balance of terror) is not at all Schmittian – it is a model in which the interactions between the two opposing forces and poles also suppose forms of complementarity, some sort of conflictual complementarity which is reminiscent of the type of relationship that has been established between the capitalist bourgeoisie (the state and the employers) and the workers' movement, in Western Europe, from the end of the 19th century to 1970-80. [1]
This is the reason why, in this plastic configuration, we can see how figures of extreme violence (the Vietnam War) coexisted with or alternated with figures of detente (peaceful coexistence, the souvenir photos on which Khrushchev and Kennedy display their good understanding). We have here a matrix (political, discursive…) which is not at all Schmittian insofar as it challenges the figure of the enemy doomed to pure and simple destruction, elimination, extermination – this for multiple reasons, this interminable post-war period being, among others and simultaneously, the world after Auschwitz and Hiroshima – a world, therefore, in which the figure of the pure and simple extermination of the enemy continued to arouse a staggering effect. In this contrasting world where the agon is placed under the sign of the most constant of ambiguities, the enemy is fought relentlessly, but “we” also talk with him, “we” deal with him, “we” make compromises and, when tensions reach a dangerous paroxysm, the people in charge activate security mechanisms whose effectiveness has never been denied (see on that the rocket crisis in Cuba – a kind of paradigm). [2]

8
Taiwan as a field for disinformation

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

The “aggressive” Chinese raids over Taiwan
In the past years we have seen countless alarming headlines about the repeated sorties by Chinese military aircrafts allegedly threatening Taiwan. Although such flights did exist, their divergent discursive interpretation merits further examination. Taiwan's government and Western media in general have been railing against these numerous “aggressive intrusions”. [3] From the other side of the strait, these air operations are not only justified, but their number has been increasing as they gained media exposure. The analysis of these discourses can help us elucidate how to account for these opposing positions around the same objective fact.
To begin with, only a share of journalist pieces or political statements have specified that those flights took place over the Taiwanese “Air Defence Identification Zone” (ADIZ), and it is almost impossible to find publications that have made the effort to explain what this entails. Mistakenly, journalists and politicians sometimes directly mention incursions into “Taiwanese airspace” or flights “over Taiwan”, confusing readers either as a result of ignorance or a concealed interest in disinformation. This is also the result of the hegemonic language that rejoices in the description of an evil China and a threatened democratic Taiwan, a Manichean and simplistic description of a highly complex conflict anchored by antagonistic discourses lacking perspective. As public discourse and democratic debate relies on the political imaginary constructed by such narratives, it is necessary to initiate a deep discursive analysis on the construction of Chinese “aggression” through hegemonic language. The ultimate hope is to help broaden the much-needed perspective when analysing conflicts such as that of Taiwan, around which this discursive struggle is highly pronounced. To be more specific, this article will focus on the discursive strategy of a British mass media that has long blown in favour of the language of hegemony : The Guardian.

Among the dozens of The Guardian news items that mention the “ADIZ”, “Taiwan air defence zone” [4] is mentioned on a good number of occasions, dropping the word “identification” and making it sound more severe as it becomes a purely “defensive” zone. On a couple of occasions there is even talk of “Taiwan scrambles jet fighters after Chinese aircraft enter airspace”, [5] or of “incursions into Taiwanese airspace”. [6] The case of a lengthy opinion piece mentioning the “Taiwanese airspace” and co-authored by The Guardian's Taipei correspondent, Helen Davidson, who should know better being placed in Taiwan, is particularly infamous. [7] Regardless of our opinion in relation to the attitude of the Chinese military activities, the fact that those claims are misleading or directly false must not be ignored.
But in order to understand that the Chinese military aircrafts entered the ADIZ and not the Taiwanese airspace, it is first necessary to explain what each thing is, since the average reader is not usually familiar with these terms. The overwhelming majority of “incursions” on the Taiwanese ADIZ occur over international waters south of the island, more than 100 kilometres off the coast of Taiwan, so that the Chinese aircrafts have neither entered Taiwanese air space nor flown in its direction. [8] In fact, the coast of Taiwan is closer to the Chinese coast than it is to the area where these “aggressive incursions” in the ADIZ are reported. If one day China was to create its own ADIZ in this portion of the South China Sea, which it could perfectly do, it would surely superimpose itself on parts of the over-dimensioned Taiwanese ADIZ, since parts of it are closer to China's coast than to Taiwan's.
Based on international legislation, the notion of sovereign airspace corresponds to the maritime definition of territorial waters, which is 22.2 kilometres away from the coastline. The ADIZ, however, is something very different. To begin with, “ADIZ has not any legal foundation that is explicitly stipulated in International law”. [9] In fact, only about twenty countries in the world have established an ADIZ. China did not have any until 2013, when news broke of its establishment covering a large area of the East China Sea coming into conflict with the ADIZs of neighbouring countries. How is this possible ? Plain and simple, because each country establishes its ADIZ based on its own criteria, without any type of limit or written guide stipulated by international law. And so we have that the ADIZ of Taiwan not only occupies a very wide strip of international maritime space to the south of the island, but it also reaches well inside the territory of mainland China. In other words, the Taiwanese ADIZ overlaps Chinese airspace. Thus, incursions over the Taiwanese ADIZ strictly occur on a daily basis since, paradoxically, there are plenty of Chinese military airports within the Taiwanese ADIZ.
Of course, to avoid this absurdity, the Taiwanese military acts only when Chinese military planes cross the purported “middle line” of the Taiwan Strait separating the island from the mainland. However, this line also lacks international validity : it was created ad hoc by the United States (US) during the Cold War to protect the proto-fascist regime of the Republic of China (ROC) exiled to the island. Furthermore, it cannot be considered as a line separating two countries at war, such as the Demilitarised Zone separating the two Koreas, inasmuch as the ROC is not considered internationally as a different country from the People's Republic of China (PRC). In other words, China does not commit any affront against international law by crossing the “middle line”, or by flying its aircrafts through the Taiwanese ADIZ—which is somewhat different from Taiwan's national airspace—even if those actions can be subjectively deemed as irresponsible due to the undeniable tensions existing between the ROC and the PRC.

To further clarify, an ADIZ usually has to fulfil three conditions : it only covers undisputed territory (which is not the case of Taiwan's ADIZ), it does not apply to foreign aircrafts not intending to enter territorial airspace (which is why it should not apply to Chinese military aircrafts flying over international waters and with a direction other than the island of Taiwan), and it does not overlap other ADIZs (which is the case with Taiwan as it overlaps Chinese airspace and any reasonable Chinese ADIZ created in the area). When the PRC established its first ADIZ in the East China Sea, in conflict with those of other countries (South Korea, Japan, ROC), legal experts attacked China by arguing that “the specific identification requirements declared by China go beyond typical ADIZs in that they apply to aircraft flying through the zone but not entering Chinese airspace”. [10] However, the same reasoning process is totally absent on critiques of the Chinese incursions over Taiwan's ADIZ. In addition, experts indicated an especially significant legal concern : “that if China enforces its ADIZ in ways that prevents other states from freely transiting that airspace, it would violate freedom of overflight rights on the high seas”. [11] Well, this is precisely what Taiwan is doing now, chasing Chinese airplanes for entering an airspace over waters where there should be freedom of overflight and accusing them of carrying “threatening” incursions, when these planes only fly through the area but do not enter or head towards the Taiwanese airspace. What in one case was described as a sign of the Chinese authoritarian threat, in the case of Taiwan it was viewed favourably, depicting China as an aggressor.

The Chinese side sees, thus, the issue from a very different perspective. From this standpoint, the problem with the Taiwanese ADIZ is that it is designed in such a way that it damages the PRC's freedom to fly through international waters in this area as do, for example, the military planes of the Taiwanese allies. For instance, when US military airplanes fly over the Taiwanese ADIZ, they are neither tracked by surface-to-air missiles nor are Taiwanese jets scrambled to push them out. Therefore, China feels cornered by this discriminatory ADIZ, which would only make sense under a perspective of war : it is a statement that for the Taiwanese authorities the civil war is still ongoing. The use of the ADIZ “should value sovereignty of the other countries in order to maintain international peace and security”, [12] and this does not happen in the case of Taiwan and its over-sized and over-enforced ADIZ. The question that arises then is why Taiwan and its allies make such a fuss. The answer is that it is not merely because of practical military considerations but because of the discursive struggle framed within this New Cold War mentality between China and the US (plus its allies).
On the one hand, the United States, Taiwan and, in general, the entire anti-China coalition that fears the growth of this country, take advantage of these events to insist on the rhetoric of the perfect enemy. China is discursively constructed as the vile communist monster that destroys everything it touches, which plans to subdue its neighbours and rivals for its own benefit, which attacks and threatens without reasonable argument, only for the enjoyment of its evil leadership. Of course this is done in a way that becomes naturalised through gradual repetition and beautiful words. These Chinese incursions are often described as “grey zone tactics” that wear down and intimidate the inferior Taiwanese air forces (a form of “war of attrition”), so that in March 2021 the government of Taiwan decided to suspend the interdiction of each one of these raids and simply monitor them by means of radars and anti-aircraft missiles.
Even more shocking is the fact that in 2017 the ROC's Ministry of National Defence said that, “as similar incidents had grown too common over the past weeks”, it would “no longer issue reports about aircraft or ships from China's People Liberation Army moving close to Taiwan”. [13] It made more sense to act without so much trumpet blasting and avoid scaremongering, social polarisation, militaristic escalation, and massive expenditure (through massive weapon purchases). Why did that all change ? The short answer is that the ADIZ issue is now instrumentalized to further demonise China : exaggerating and misrepresenting it is part of the recent discursive strategy that bolsters Taiwan's DPP position as a pillar of containment against the global enemy. The element of exaggeration and misrepresentation of reality applies to practically every factor of geopolitical contention of which China is a part, and the ADIZ issue is no different. As the Taiwan's premier gladly put it when referring to these incursions : “It's evident that the world, the international community, rejects such behaviours by China more and more”. [14]

12
How wars fall on us
Alain Brossat and Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado

One of the paradoxical effects of propaganda is that instead of keeping us alert, it anaesthetises us. When you have been told for years that the neighbour, the close enemy, threatens to invade you and could well do so the next morning, you end up getting accustomed to this type of message, however alarmist it may be, and you go about your ordinary business rather than arranging the construction of a personal or family fallout shelter... It is also because more is needed than just the mechanical repetition of propaganda messages and a spasmodic agitation against the enemy at our gates to convince us effectively of the actuality of war directly affecting us, that is to say of the possibility of a war which, this time, would no longer take place in newspapers, on television screens, or on social networks, but indeed in our own lives, which would directly affect our living conditions and endanger our own existence.
What, in the first place, characterises us, inhabitants of the Global North, is in fact that we consider our condition immune or rather immunised, that is to say secure and protected against vital dangers (war first and foremost) as something granted, a constituent element of our condition. We know, of course, that we do not live in a world or an age which has left war behind, either by the grace of the uninterrupted moral progress of mankind or by that of the wisdom of our leaders ; but fundamentally, for us, war, the wars that surround us, more or less close or more or less distant, are images, they are information, they are indeed a kind of spectacle, violent and repulsive – but it only affects others.
Therefore, the specificity of our immune condition is to arouse the generalised illusion of an exclusion clause : one that would make our latitudes, in the Global North, by destination and so to speak by right, areas where war is banished. The reverse or complement of this illusion is the radical loss of the imaginative faculties that would allow us to anticipate the possibility that, despite everything, war will one day fall on us.

The foundations of this illusion are both socio-cultural and historical. In the generally democratic societies of the Global North, the pacification of mores is a general process, the effect of which is the lowering of the level of violence in human relationships and interactions, the rise of immune paradigms in all spheres of life – relationships between men and women, adults and children, teachers and students, humans and animals, etc. Lively violence and, in general, everything related to warrior paradigms is now, in these societies, affected by a resolutely negative sign. Not only do we live in peace, but this peace is now intimately linked to the sphere of morals and daily life. It is in this sense that, naturally, terrorism, such as it is likely to burst into our peaceful spaces, inspires us with particular horror.
But it is also because we have now come to the end of a long historical sequence placed under the paradoxical sign of an armed peace, of a cold war overhung by the sword of Damocles of nuclear terror, and which, precisely, by freezing the balance of power and establishing a kind of balance of terror, has not led to a hot war.
As a result, we have almost come to make “nuclear deterrence” our own spontaneous or implicit religion of peace. We have become accustomed to a world where, strangely, the balance of terror “protected” us, has made it possible to overcome several major crises between the opposing power blocs (Korean War, Budapest insurrection, Cuban Missile Crisis, blockade of Berlin, Vietnam War, invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army...) and where the wars, from then on, were projected and disseminated on all the periphery of the Global North, which has somehow become a sanctuary.
For us Europeans, the first alerts indicating that the feeling of security resulting from this situation of relative equilibrium was in truth illusory occurred even before the fall of the Soviet bloc : from the beginning of the 1980s with the arms race on our soil between the two superpowers of the time, the United States and the USSR, with the dangerous rise in the bidding surrounding the establishment in the two Germany(ies) of the time of the Pershing and SS 20 medium-range rockets, both likely to be equipped with nuclear charges... And then, the quite tangible sign of the change of era in progress, traumatising in many respects for European opinions, was the return of the war on the very soil of old Europe with the break-up of Yugoslavia, in the din of arms, with its procession of massacres, acts of barbarism, scenes of civil war against the backdrop of a Balkan remake of the Second World War world...
The problem is that we have an infinite faculty not to “believe”, that is to say not to draw the intellectual and practical consequences of what, moreover, we know perfectly ; this is true of war as it is of global warming, the mirage of economic growth, etc. In Europe, we had before our eyes, on our doorstep, an entire decade of intra-Yugoslavian wars (1991-2001) and that should have been enough to convince us that war had returned “among us”, that it was more than time to dismiss the illusion that our privileged existences would be placed under a regime of perpetual peace.
But, in practice, everything happened as if a thick, hermetic wall of glass separated us from the Yugoslav war. As long as shells didn't fall on us, and none of our towns were besieged, as long as our immune way of life wasn't affected, we were inclined to carry on as before, sticking to our course, going about our business and acting as if peace was contractually guaranteed to us, once and for all.
The war in Ukraine is what brought us out of this interminable torpor, this all too comfortable illusion. If European governments and public opinion have reacted with such vociferous indignation to the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army, it is not in the first place under the effect of moral, humanitarian sentiments, of convictions backed by international law, human rights, the horror that a war of conquest inspires in us, etc. It is in fact that Putin's unexpected initiative produced the most painful of awakenings and effects of the return to reality ; this, by tearing Europeans (not only, but first and foremost, for obvious reasons) from the foundations of the new epoch. This epoch is not the era of the glorious and irresistible democratic globalization which only the last four of the retarded authoritarian and totalitarian regimes resist ; it is indeed that in which the Western hegemony in decline is put to battle in order to confront the rising powers which, more and more openly, challenge this hegemony and no longer bend before the dictates of the universalist imperialism of Western democracy. This new epoch is, in the present, that of a New Cold War now liable to heat up disastrously on the occasion of the first local or regional crisis to come. In this configuration, the fiction of the sanctuaries of the Global North spared by the war is shattered.
This is what the new Ukrainian paradigm shows perfectly : if it happens, as the strategists of the new Atlanticism say (whether in the American or European version), that the “borders of NATO” are those separating the opposing worlds of the democratic West and Putinian despotism, then the slightest armed incident on the border of Poland and Ukraine or Belarus is likely to turn into a casus belli leading to a war of the worlds...

It is exactly the same here, in East Asia, in obviously specific geo-political conditions – I mean : the same matrix of the time (epoch) and what makes it so dangerous is similar in this region of the world, given, of course, the obvious disparities resulting from different histories and contexts – European continent, East Asian as Grossraum, “wide space”...
You have been told for years now that you live, on this island, in one of the most dangerous places in the world, permanently exposed to the threat of invasion by your powerful neighbour, on the front line of the, for the moment, virtual war raging between the so-called “free world” (Democracy, the only civilised and tolerable regime of politics), and authoritarianism or continental totalitarianism... And the completely unexpected effect of this verbal outbidding hitherto followed by no particular effect, is that these cries of alarm which are also battle cries have become background noise that you have gotten used to and which, although they keep getting more and more deafening, do not prevent you from sleeping and, above all, do not change your habits.

Everything happens as if we weren't living that badly in the eye of the storm, insofar as it (this eye) presents all the appearances of a world at peace. As an island microcosm, Taiwanese society is a model of an immune society, remarkable for anyone who comes from elsewhere, from Europe, from the United States a fortiori, by the gentleness of its morals, the safety of its streets, the very low level of visible social conflict, the affability of its police, in comparison with a country like France, for example, etc. Everything happens as if, bizarrely, the perpetual incantations about the imminent threats hanging over this island and its inhabitants had an effect of suspending or revoking these very threats – as if all that was needed was to make the windmills of the “Chinese threat” turn tirelessly, so that it turns into a paper tiger.

[1] “Not at all Schmittian” means two things here : on the one hand, a configuration in which reflection and political action cannot find their exclusive basis in the distinction between friend and enemy and, on the other, a topos in which the figure of the enemy is not reducible to that of a pure and simple criminal. “ Not at all Schmittian”, therefore, means here a little more complicated (and plastic) than what we usually remember from Carl Schmitt's political philosophy.

[2] On this point, see Andrew Cockburn's article “ Defensive, not Aggressive “ and whose author, returning to the rocket crisis in Cuba, believes that there was never, during this episode, any real danger of war, Kennedy and Khrushchev being equally determined to avoid it and masters of the game in domestic politics. London Review of Books, September 2021.

[3] Everington, K. (2020, November 17). 2 US B1-B bombers penetrate China's ADIZ, near Taiwan. Taiwan News. Retrieved from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4055703

[4] E.g. Hurst, D. (2021, January 29). Australian military to continue patrolling South China Sea as Beijing warns Taiwan independence ‘means war'. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/29/australian-military-to-continue-patrolling-south-china-sea-as-china-warns-taiwan-independence-means-war ; Davidson, H. (2021, October 4). US condemns China for ‘provocative' aircraft sorties into Taiwan defence zone. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/04/us-condemns-china-for-provocative-aircraft-sorties-into-taiwan-defence-zone

[5] Taiwan scrambles jet fighters after Chinese aircraft enter airspace (2020, February 10). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/10/taiwan-scrambles-jet-fighters-after-chinese-aircraft-enter-airspace

[6] Yang, S. (2020, October 9). Two Chinese warplanes approach Taiwan-held disputed islands on eve of national day. Taiwan News. Retrieved from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4026586

[7] Graham-Harrison, E., & Davidson, H. (2020, October 5). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/after-hong-kong-china-taiwan-invasion-armed-forces

[8] Chinese military condemns US and Canada over warships in Taiwan Strait (2021, October 17). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/17/chinese-military-condemns-us-and-canada-over-warships-in-taiwan-strait

[9] Bakhtiar, H. S., Djanur, N. A., Ashri, M., Hendrapati, M. (2016). Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in International Law Perspective. Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 56, p. 16.

[10] Waxman, M. (2014, November 25). China's ADIZ at one year : international legal issues. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Retrieved from https://amti.csis.org/chinas-adiz-at-one-year-international-legal-issues/

[11] Ibid.

[12] Op. Cit., Ref. 7, p. 16.

[13] Strong, M. (2017, December 20). ATaiwan military will no longer publicize Chinese incursions. Taiwan News. Retrieved from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3324727

[14] Davidson, H. (2021, October 4). US condemns China for ‘provocative' aircraft sorties into Taiwan defence zone. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/04/us-condemns-china-for-provocative-aircraft-sorties-into-taiwan-defence-zone

Que se passe-t-il au Xinjiang ? Un défi épistémologique

Alain Brossat, Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado — 2021-03-30T23:54:16Z

Lorsque Hannah Arendt écrivit son long article « Du mensonge en politique – réflexions sur les documents du Pentagone », inspiré par les révélations du Washington Post sur les manipulations de l'opinion par l'autorité politique à propos de la guerre du Vietnam, elle pouvait encore opposer au mensonge d'Etat la figure de la presse indépendante et de la vocation de celle-ci à dévoiler l'imposture et rétablir les faits : « Une presse libre et non corrompue a une mission d'une importance considérable à remplir qui lui permet à juste titre de revendiquer le nom de quatrième pouvoir » écrit-elle. Elle souligne le « droit à une information véridique et non manipulée sans quoi la liberté d'opinion n'est plus qu'une cruelle mystification ».

Aujourd'hui, dans le contexte de la nouvelle guerre froide entre les Etats-Unis (avec l'Occident global qui, en l'occurrence, leur fait cortège) et la Chine, un affrontement qui, de plus en plus prend la tournure d'une « guerre des mondes » à la H. G. Wells, cette dernière espérance des défenseurs des droits de la vérité, dans le domaine politique, a, depuis quelque temps déjà volé en éclats. Ce qu'Arendt appelle la presse indépendante et qui n'est plus qu'une presse capitaliste aux mains de puissances économiques et financières soucieuses avant tout de leurs parts de marché dans le business de la communication n'est plus, depuis belle lurette, le recours ou la solution, mais bien le problème ou une partie de celui-ci.
Déjà, dans son article, Arendt souligne la fragilité des faits face aux logiques de l'action politique, face au régime sous lequel celle-ci se place : la propension au mensonge, dit-elle, est consubstantielle à l'action, « et l'action est évidemment la substance même dont est faite l'action politique ». Le mensonge a toujours accompagné l'action politique comme son ombre, « la véracité n'a jamais figuré au nombre des vertus politiques ». Dans le domaine politique, la tentation permanente de la falsification porte, rappelle Arendt, moins sur des faits avérés (comme le sont, pour une part, ceux qui ont trait au passé historique) mais sur « une réalité contingente », mouvante et ouverte aux interprétations divergentes. Cette « matière » sur lequel la politique vise à exercer son action « n'est pas porteuse d'une vérité intrinsèque et intangible ». Il en découle « qu'aucune déclaration portant sur des faits ne peut être entièrement à l'abri du doute – aussi invulnérable à toute forme d'attaques que, par exemple, cette affirmation : deux et deux font quatre ».
Mais avec tout cela, dit-elle, dans une société ouverte où existent des contre-pouvoirs et d'autres sources de discours sur la politique au présent que celui des gens de l'exécutif ou des militaires, où la pensée critique a ses propres canaux d'expression, les mensonges d'Etat, notamment quand ils atteignent un certain état de saturation et entrent violemment en collision avec des pans entiers de la réalité, peuvent être exposés en place publique – et c'est ici que la presse indépendante est notamment appelée à jouer son rôle. En exposant les dissimulations, les mensonges délibérés, les falsifications, en publiant les documents qui attestent que les gouvernants ont menti dans le but de « sauver la face » dans le contexte du désastre vietnamien, la presse indépendante, d'un même mouvement, rétablit les faits et redresse le tort infligé aussi bien à l'opinion (« les gens ») qu'à la démocratie états-unienne.

Il suffit d'examiner la façon dont se présente à nos yeux aujourd'hui un enjeu très sensible comme la politique d'assimilation forcée des Ouigours conduite par le pouvoir central chinois au Xinjiang pour comprendre que nous avons radicalement changé d'époque, en comparaison avec le tableau décrit par Arendt. L'enjeu Xinjiang peut être défini comme particulièrement sensible à plus d'un égard : comme l'une des pommes de discorde majeures dans la nouvelle guerre froide, d'abord ; mais aussi pour autant qu'il est exemplaire des difficultés que nous éprouvons à nous orienter dans cette dispute, des obstacles que nous rencontrons dans la quête d'une information sûre, nous donnant accès à des éléments de réalité et des faits assurés.

En effet, la première chose dont nous faisons durablement l'expérience ici, c'est notre condition d'otages de la guerre des discours – deux appareils et deux discours de propagande s'affrontent et tout nous porte à nous défier de l'un comme de l'autre, tout aussi rigoureusement. Dans la configuration où se situent les réflexions d'Arendt sur le mensonge en politique, elle peut identifier un point de fuite hors de la saturation des espaces publics par le mensonge d'Etat : la presse indépendante va pouvoir jouer, sur cette scène le rôle très en faveur dans la culture états-unienne du redresseur de torts dont l'intervention ménage une sorte de happy-end salvateur – elle a, in extremis, sauvé la « démocratie américaine », en dépit de la sale guerre perdue à l'autre bout du monde [1]...
Dans la configuration présente, au contraire, ce qui nous frappe et nous exténue, c'est l'absence d'une telle ligne de fuite, car nous ne pouvons faire recours à aucune instance (source d'information productrice d'un récit que l'on puisse considérer a priori comme véridique sur la situation au Xinjiang), tous les émetteurs de discours, y compris à statut en principe désintéressé – académique ou humanitaire –, apparaissent à des degrés divers mais distinctement « sous influence », c'est-à-dire surdéterminés par la perspective du locuteur, sa position dans le champ de l'affrontement global dont l'objet Xinjiang est l'enjeu. Le discours académique occidental, notamment, est, nous l'avons évoqué dans un article précédent, particulièrement préempté par toutes sortes d'a priori idéologiques, parfois caricaturaux.
Lorsque nous tentons de nous faire une opinion sur la situation au Xinjiang [2], nous éprouvons que nous vivons sous un régime de tyrannie des discours et des appareils communicationnels d'un type tout à fait particulier. A la différence de ce qui prévaut dans des conditions totalitaires (ce que Czeslaw Milosz appelle les logocraties) , ce n'est pas le monopole de l'information détenu par une puissance unique qui tue l'information et avec elle toute chance pour le sujet humain ordinaire d'accéder à des sources fiables et véridiques – nous avons au contraire accès à une profusion d'émetteurs (pour ce qui est des sources primaires, c'est en fait beaucoup plus réduit), presse écrite, orale, télés, infos en ligne, réseaux sociaux, etc.), avec une ligne de front bien dessinée – discours occidental d'un côté et discours de l'Etat chinois de l'autre. Tous ces discours sont, à des degrés d'intensité variables, contaminés par des biais propagandistes, que cela relève d'une orientation concertée ou que cela résulte de contraintes telles que la rareté des sources et leur fragilité ou leur partialité. Comme le remarque Arendt, là où la question du mensonge politique commence à se compliquer considérablement, c'est là où le locuteur qui parle sous le régime d'un discours orienté, partisan, saisi par la guerre des mondes, commence à croire à ce qu'il raconte, là où l'ignorance, l'autosuggestion et la tromperie commencent à ne faire plus qu'un. « Plus un trompeur est convaincant et réussit à convaincre, plus il a de chances de croire lui-même à ses propres mensonges », écrit Arendt.

L'ensemble des faits qui constituent la situation à propos de laquelle nous sommes appelés à opiner et, éventuellement nous engager, est littéralement écrasé sous le bombardement en tapis de discours destinés, à des titres divers, à mettre l'opinion globale en condition. Dans cette situation, nous sommes conduits à nous former une opinion non pas fondée sur des faits et des données dont nous avons pu nous assurer qu'ils sont solidement établis mais sur une fragile herméneutique consistant en une analyse critique des discours.
Nous sommes appelés à mettre en rapport des questions de vraisemblance (ou d'invraisemblance) avec des enjeux d'utilité. Ce qui, par exemple, va nous porter à rejeter le recours massif à la notion de « génocide » dans le discours émis par certains commentateurs occidentaux, à commencer par l'administration états-unienne et ses suppôts directs, c'est, d'abord, deux choses : d'une part la très grande improbabilité du fait qu'un génocide à proprement parler (des exterminations massives effectuées sur une base de sélection ethnique et religieuse dans le cas présent) puisse être conduit sur un territoire vers lequel tous les regards sont actuellement tournés sans que puissent s'en accumuler des preuves irrécusables, par témoignage direct et indirect, données incontestables obtenues par surveillance électronique, aérienne, recoupements divers, etc. Les informations qui ont jusqu'à présent servi à étayer la thèse du génocide qui s'accomplirait au Xinjiang proviennent d'un nombre restreint de sources qui sont pour la plupart massivement et ouvertement partisanes, engagées dans la croisade anti-chinoise ( à l'instar de l'omniprésent Adrian Zenz et de certaines « think tanks » aux financements et engagements douteux). Ces informateurs fondent leurs analyses sur des éléments disparates tels que ces quelques documents que laisse filtrer l'opacité entretenue par le régime chinois et le peu d'images satellites disponibles sur lesquelles on voit des bâtiments apparaître ou disparaître... C'est tout ce bric-à-brac d'informations qui se trouve ensuite assemblé et interprété de manière à fournir à l'opinion ce qu'elle souhaite entendre – ce qui entre parfaitement dans le cadre de la production d'une « post-vérité » nourrie par ces fake news qui, désormais, défraient la chronique.
C'est, d'autre part, que désormais, l'administration états-unienne sous Trump, promptement relayée par celle de Biden, est portée à prendre pour argent comptant les récits provenant de ces sources et à en faire le fondement de sa politique étrangère. Pire, aux Etats-Unis, dès lors qu'il est question de la Chine, on voit s'effacer les frontières partisanes, que ce soit dans les médias ou dans la politique des partis – dans le contexte de la fin de l'ère trumpienne, Républicains et Démocrates s'étripent sur tous les sujets – et parlent d'une voix sur la Chine et le Xinjiang. Cette configuration états-unienne contamine tous les pays de l'Occident global, comme on peut le vérifier aisément en France.

Le jeu rhétorique de ceux qui spéculent sur l'emploi lancinant du terme génocide dans ce contexte est transparent : il s'agit, dans un contexte de vif antagonisme entre deux blocs de puissance, de discréditer moralement l'un des protagoniste, de le criminaliser en le situant sur un même plan que des pouvoirs et Etats criminels tels que l'Allemagne nazie, le régime soviétique à l'époque du stalinisme classique, les Khmers rouges, le Hutu Power... Il s'agit à la fois de noircir autant qu'il est possible l'image de la Chine et de faire apparaître celle-ci comme un espace dans lequel se multiplient les points de tension (Hong Kong, Taïwan, le Tibet et maintenant le Xinjiang) – une façon comme une autre de dessiner la perspective d'une balkanisation de la Chine (comme l'écrivait récemment Jon Solomon), en encourageant les mouvement sécessionnistes susceptibles d'entraver l'expansion globale de la puissance chinoise.

Avec tout cela, il demeure que la rigueur herméneutique est ici un pis-aller, dans la mesure où elle ne nous permet que de nous dissocier de récits propagandistes. De la même façon que nous ne gobons pas l'œuf totalitaire, un peu trop gros quand même, de même nous ne nous laissons pas embarquer quand la propagande pékinoise tente de nous convaincre que les fameux « camps », sur lesquels se cristallise actuellement toute la dispute autour de la situation au Xinjiang, ne sont que des centres de formation destinés à améliorer le niveau d'éducation et de compétence des forces vives du peuple ouïgour – une version qui, après la dystopie orwellienne occidentale sent, à son tour, un peu trop son « meilleur des mondes »... Mais, en écartant ces récits caricaturaux, on limite les dégâts, on évite de former des jugements hâtifs fondés sur des sources sans valeur – on ne parvient pas pour autant à se faire une idée tout à fait distincte de la situation.

La médiacratie contemporaine s'efforce de reconstituer son crédit de légitimité bien entamé en se posant constamment en défenseure et gardienne de la consistance des faits face aux « fake news ». Mais on voit bien là qu'il s'agit d'un tour rhétorique : le « cas » du Xinjiang montre de façon éclatante que, de la guerre des propagandes et des appareils de communication, les faits ne reviennent pas indemnes. Le tableau idyllique et simplificateur qui consiste à opposer le mensonge et les menteurs politiques avérés et rogues aux discours vrais et aux redresseurs d'énoncés respectables en tant que représentants d'un pouvoir à forte légitimité dans les sociétés démocratiques (celui d'informer, précisément) est lui-même un mensonge et une falsification. Ce qu'est au juste, à proprement parler, sur le terrain, la campagne d'acculturation forcée entreprise par les autorités chinoises au Xingjiang, nous ne le savons pas. Nous pouvons cerner la situation dans ses grands traits, discerner ce qu'elle n'est pas, mais ce tableau général et vague est tout différent de ce que nous avons pu apprendre, même, de la purification ethnique exterminatrice conduite par l'Armée birmane dans les régions rurales habitées par la population royinghas. C'est, entre autres, que nous n'avons pas les mêmes raisons d'être circonspects face aux témoignages recueillis parmi les réfugiés des camps du Bangladesh que ceux de ces exilés ouïgours aux Etats-Unis, immédiatement embarqués dans la spirale des enjeux propagandistes et récupérés par les officines correspondantes.

A plus d'un égard, cette situation d'impasse cognitive (« gnoséologique ») rappelle celle que l'on a connue au temps de la première Guerre froide à propos des camps soviétiques. De la même façon, toute information à leur propos se trouvait surdéterminée par les enjeux propagandistes. La gauche occidentale se déchirait entre ceux qui considéraient que toute information publiée à propos de ces camps servait « objectivement » la propagande anticommuniste et apportait de l'eau au moulin de l'impérialisme (les PC occidentaux et leurs sympathisants, pour l'essentiel) et ceux qui jugeaient que, concernant les pratiques criminelles d'un Etat à grande échelle, la nécessité de l'établissement des faits et de la dénonciation du crime l'emportait sur toute autre considération. Le débat faisait rage avec une vigueur toute particulière parmi les anciens déportés des camps de concentration nazis – ceux qui voyaient dans les zeks, les détenus des camps soviétiques, des frères de souffrance, et ceux qui voulaient se souvenir, avant tout, que la majorité des camps nazis avaient été libérés par l'Armée soviétique. Deux affaires ont scandé cette guerre des récits, en France tout particulièrement, l'Affaire Kravchenko et l'Affaire David Rousset [3].

Aussi surprenant que cela puisse paraître aujourd'hui, cette guerre ne portait pas sur l'interprétation d'une réalité donnée mais bien sur l'établissement des faits : pour la presse communiste occidentale de l'époque, Kravchenko était un affabulateur, un faussaire, un imposteur politique et un mercenaire idéologique qui faisait du motif nébuleux des camps soviétiques l'outil de sa progagande contre l'URSS ; David Rousset, ancien déporté passé dans le camp de la réaction, écrivait la presse stalinienne française, avait inventé le goulag (un terme qui ne fut « popularisé » que plus tard, lors de la publication du livre d'Alexandre Soljénitsyne) afin de discréditer le combat des communistes.
La grande différence, cependant, avec le défi que représente pour nous la question du Xinjiang, c'est que depuis le début des années 1930, de très nombreux témoignages directs de personnes ayant traversé l'archipel concentrationnaire soviétique avaient été publiés en Occident ; des témoignages émanant de témoins et de survivants dont les profils sociaux et politiques étaient très variés, des récits autobiographiques souvent très détaillés, et de grande qualité – si bien qu'en dépit de la puissance des moyens de propagande des staliniens dans certains pays (le PCF était alors au sommet de sa puissance), l'existence d'un système concentrationnaire soviétique était des plus attestables par les moyens habituels de la critique historique, notamment le recoupement des témoignages, mais d'autres sources encore comme les fameuses archives de Smolensk saisies par l'armée nazie lors de l'invasion de l'URSS par la Wehrmacht [4]. Simplement, dans cette configuration de guerre froide et d'affrontement des discours, toute une partie de l'opinion, dans les milieux populaires comme parmi l'intelligentsia favorables à l'URSS, victorieuse dans la guerre contre le fascisme, ne croyait pas aux camps soviétiques, ne voulait pas y croire, pour des raisons idéologiques – ce qui, à nouveau, constitue la plus probante des démonstrations en faveur de ce que Hannah Arendt appelle la fragilité des faits politiques.

Nous nous trouvons, avec la question des camps au Xinjiang, dans une situation inversée, en comparaison de celle qui prévalait au temps de la première Guerre froide, à propos des camps soviétiques : les opinions occidentales, dans toute leur diversité, sont en général prêtes à croire aujourd'hui qu'un véritable archipel concentrationnaire (avec tout ce que cela suppose pour peu que l'on prenne cette notion tout à fait au sérieux) existe dans cette province chinoise et que des centaines de milliers d'Ouïgours y croupissent, y subissent les traitements les plus dégradants, y meurent – comme les déportés mouraient dans les camps nazis ou soviétiques. Bien rares sont ceux qui sont déterminés à exiger davantage de précision ou de données, destinées à leur permettre de se faire une opinion distincte de ce que sont ces camps en vérité. C'est que, d'une façon générale, le discours sinophobe (portant au-delà de l'hostilité au régime et ravivant de très anciens stéréotypes) exerce une emprise à peu près sans partage sur les esprits sous les latitudes occidentales – une situation surprenante au regard de ce que nous enseigne la plus élémentaires des doxas démocratiques – l'homogénéité ou la compacité de l'opinion sur un sujet de première importance étant censé être, en principe, le propre de conditions totalitaires plutôt que démocratiques. L'opinion occidentale ne se divise pas à propos des camps au Xinjiang, personne ou presque n'a le goût d'ergoter sur les mots et les comparaisons auxquels a recours le récit occidental de la situation dans cette province, pour la bonne raison que, comme l'indiquent les sondages, l'opinion, mise en condition par le discours de guerre froide, a une perception de plus en plus négative de la Chine en général et de son régime en particulier.
Ceci de la même façon exactement, mais en sens inverse, qu'une partie de l'opinion, en Europe occidentale, se refusait à prendre acte de l'existence des camps soviétiques, du fait même de sa propension à héroïser le pays, le peuple et le régime qui avaient tordu le cou au nazisme.

En quoi devrait consister ici la posture critique, dans le sens philosophique et positif du terme ? Sans doute en premier lieu à exiger des précisions ; à dire : lorsque vous parlez de camps de concentration, de goulag et de génocide au Xinjiang, qu'entendez-vous par là, au juste ? Combien de morts, quelles techniques d'extermination – par la faim, le froid, les épidémies, les armes, le travail forcé, les gaz ? En l'absence de tels éléments de comparaison avec d'autres configurations historiques, qu'est-ce qui vous porte à risquer quand même ce type de rapprochement ? Où est votre intérêt politique dans cet agencement de discours ?
Et de la même façon, il s'agirait de demander à l'autre partie : s'il ne s'agit que de programmes de rééducation et de formation, pourquoi des camps – puisque camps, à l'évidence, il y a ? Depuis quand le camp (un vocable chargé, dans toutes les langues du monde, on peut l'imaginer, de puissantes connotations négatives) se destine-t-il en premier lieu à des tâches éducatives ? Depuis quand un séjour forcé dans un camp (à l'évidence, ceux du Xinjiang ne sont pas peuplés de volontaires) peut-il s'assimiler à un stage de citoyenneté ?
Ou bien encore : est-il vrai que des mosquées ont été, sont encore détruites au Xingjiang, une région dont la population autochtone est musulmane ? Si oui, pour quelles raisons, à quelles fins ? Est-il vrai que la célébration des fêtes religieuses musulmanes (Ramadan...) est routinièrement entravée par les autorités et donne lieu à des vexations, des intimidations, voire des persécutions ? Est-il vrai que des campagnes de limitation des naissances concernant spécifiquement les femmes ouigours (et à ce titre discriminatoires) sont conduites dans la région ? Etc. [5]

C'est au fil de demandes de précisions faisant référence à ce qui se dit et s'écrit à propos de la situation dans la région que peut se dessiner un tableau de ce qui est en cours et en jeu actuellement au Xinjiang – une campagne massive d'assimilation forcée, d'acculturation fondée sur des procédés autoritaires et des moyens brutaux – mais qui, pour autant, ne sont pas ceux d'une purification ethnique consistant à évacuer par la force une population du territoire sur lequel elle vit, au prix de massacres « exemplaires » (Srebrenica), ni, a fortiori, d'un programme génocidaire consistant à faire disparaître ce groupe humain de la surface de la terre (le « paradigme » rwandais). Au vu des caractéristiques propres à cette situation, le trait néo-colonial, néo-impérial de cette opération est distinct. Les Ouïgours sont traités par un pouvoir imbu de ses prérogatives politiques sur un fond de présomption raciale comme des subalternes, en tant qu'ils seraient une population arriérée, sous l'emprise de préjugés religieux rétrogrades, et vus, dans le contexte post-11/09, comme une population associée à une religion dangereuse, porteuse de ferments terroristes (une crainte et un stéréotype alimentés, bien sûr, par ces actions terroristes sanglantes qui ont été le fait de groupes ouïgours radicalisés, ceci avant que soit mis en place le dispositif de « rééducation » actuellement en cours – avec les camps qui vont avec.

C'est là assurément une politique détestable, vouée à l'échec et, à plus d'un titre criminelle, dans les moyens qu'elle emploie comme dans les buts qu'elle s'assigne, une politique entre autres qui prospère sur un fond d'islamophobie qui ne nous est, hélas, que trop familier. Mais ce n'est là en aucun cas une raison suffisante pour la faire passer pour ce qu'elle n'est pas ni ne saurait être – une entreprise exterminationniste et génocidaire. Il en va de cet enjeu très exactement comme du Covid 19 – un enjeu trop sérieux pour qu'il se prête aux surenchères propagandistes et à son instrumentalisation cynique et vulgaire par les fauteurs de guerre froide. C'est ici que la question des mots et des concepts apparaît vitale : il importe en premier lieu de dire ce que la politique du pouvoir central chinois au Xinjiang est et ce qu'elle n'est pas, et d'employer les termes, expressions et concepts adéquats pour cela.

Tout le reste n'est que de l'agitation – la sphère où s'agitent les mercenaires.

(1ère publication en anglais sur The Invisible Armada)

[1] On retiendra ici que celui qui, dans le monde présent, a joué un rôle identique en publiant des informations et des documents révélant les turpitudes de l'administration et de l'appareil militaire états-uniens est traité en criminel de haute volée, hors-la-loi, assimilé à un terroriste et traqué en conséquence – Snowden, Assange...

[2] Il faut entendre ici cette expression banale (« se faire une opinion ») comme ce qui met en jeu un peu plus que la curiosité du sujet moderne et son désir de se tenir informé des événements du jour. Il est bien évident que la situation au Xinjiang nous importe dans la mesure où elle appelle toutes sortes de diagnostics et de pronostics concernant tant le présent et l'avenir du régime chinois que celui de la « guerre des mondes » en cours.

[3] Victor Kravchenko, transfuge soviétique d'origine ukrainienne et auteur du best-seller mondial J'ai choisi la liberté (New York, 1946) ; la publication du livre en français fut l'occasion d'une polémique homérique entre staliniens et « libéraux » anticommunistes. David Rousset, militant trotskyste, résistant, déporté dans le camp nazi de Buchenwald et auteur de L'Univers concentrationnaire l'une des premières analyses des camps nazis. En 1949, il publie dans Le Figaro littéraire, quotidien conservateur, un appel d'anciens déportés des camps nazis destiné à attirer l'attention de l'opinion sur le travail forcé dans les camps soviétiques. La presse communiste se déchaîne alors contre lui, y compris d'anciens déportés communistes, ce qui débouche sur un retentissant procès en diffamation.

[4] Sur ce point, voir l'ouvrage classique de Merle Fainsod : Smolensk à l'heure de Staline, Fayard, 1967.

[5] Il importerait aussi d'historiciser la question des camps, des déportations locales, des disciplines punitives et « rééducatives » mis en œuvre actuellement au Xinjiang en les inscrivant dans la généalogie des systèmes punitifs mis en place par le régime depuis la dite Libération de 1949. La figure du camp y occupe à l'évidence une place de choix, mais tous ces camps ne sont pas ce que l'on nomme en Occident des camps de concentration. Certains sont plutôt des camps de travail et des centres de « redressement » et de rééducation idéologique où les conditions sont tout autres que celles qui prévalent dans un camp de concentration nazi ou dans les isolateurs sibériens au temps de Staline. Voir par exemple sur ce point le témoignage d'un ancien détenu de ce type de camp in Michael B. Frolic : Le peuple de Mao, scènes de la vie en Chine révolutionnaire, traduit de l'anglais par Jacques Reclus, Témoins/Gallimard, 1982, chapitre X : « Celui qui raffolait de la viande de chien » ».

Vaccines have ideology

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado — 2021-02-09T10:08:00Z

More or less the same ones that baselessly accuse China of having spread the virus on purpose and, later, overcome the pandemic in order to grow and impose its dominance—as if other countries did not have the possibility of ending the pandemic in two or three months like China did—are those who now yearn for their countries to be the first to vaccinate their population, emerge from the pandemic, and thus put one foot on the accelerator of growth and another foot on the neck of those who are slower to get out of the crisis. In short, vaccines have become a weapon for the most powerful countries, which are those that have the capital and the technology, to get out of the crisis as fast as possible so they can grow again earlier, obtain more capital and, hence, increase their power and leverage over those who come out later. Poor countries will be left behind. In a shamefully large number of countries, full vaccination will not take place until, at least, 2023 (following the data of The Economist [1]).

The director of the WHO, as well as a hundred countries in need, have asked that rich countries eliminate the intellectual property rights of vaccines so that other countries can also manufacture them and the vaccines can reach more countries and more people as soon as possible. Instead of accepting this option, the rich countries rejected this petition in the WTD, arguing that the distribution based on solidarity is enough. This is the concept of equality for the hegemonic capitalist structure : calculated solidarity so that the dominance of those at the top is not compromised. The solidarity distribution does not work. COVAX, the mechanism that has been put in place to provide vaccines to countries without money (poorer countries, paradoxically, are sold vaccines at a more expensive price than rich countries) or power of influence (even the European Union is having problems to get the vaccines they were promised, as competition between rich countries is brutal) to buy them in the wild market in which we live now, does not have enough vaccines yet to even protect health personnel in the countries that depend on it.

Rich countries propose to donate a part of the vaccines out of the great excess they have acquired (to vaccinate populations several times higher than those of their own countries), but only after they have vaccinated 70% of their populations. Thus, the pandemic, among many other effects, is making clear the operation of the capitalist system : whoever has the money has the power, and uses this power to maintain the position of dominance over it. Poor countries will emerge from this pandemic much later than rich countries, which will mean that the distance that separates ones from the others in terms of development will widen. While liberating patents would not make rich countries exit the pandemic later, it would facilitate poorer countries to exit earlier and not depend on donations, solidarity, from rich countries.

These dynamics, which are not new but perhaps these days are becoming more visible than ever, show why poor countries are not in a position of weakness because their people are lazy or inferior, as many lovers of savage neoliberalism argue. They do not escape subordination because whoever has control of the capital and technology has also the power to maintain their situation of privilege, and getting out of that vicious circle is not possible by following the rules that the countries that rule the system have established to keep them and their companies in a situation of permanent dominance. As we say in Spanish, “quien hace la ley hace la trampa” (whoever makes the rules, establishes a way to cheat). In other words, to get out of this dynamic of inequality, it is necessary to break the rules and abuse the abuser, because simply relying on donations or following the rules of the market it is not possible to change the situation of structural and premeditated inequality. The poverty is no accident, nor richness is the result of work and effort. Money produces money, and technology allows to be at the forefront of economic and military control. The poor have no real ability to alter this equation. It is a well designed system. The capitalist system is structured in such a way that for some peoples to have power, others must be subordinate. Without poor countries, rich countries could not have evolved as they have or live in the abundance—at least in relative terms to the rest of the world—in which they live today. This, at the macro level of state competition. At the micro level of community competition, those who depart from a position of privilege have a large number of possibilities to maintain that position or improve it in the future. Those who are born in poverty and subordination will rarely escape that position by simply following the rules.

Let's look at an example of how dynamics are made to keep inequality as it is. China is perhaps the only significant example of an underdeveloped country that has come to compete with traditional rich countries on an equal footing. However, to get out of its subordinate position, it has not limited itself to following the rules of the game, of the market, and has taken advantage of every opportunity to acquire technologies from other countries, whether by purchase, theft of intellectual property or any other mechanism at hand. What China has achieved is to catch up with the rich countries, not to make them poorer, but this at the same time has made it the new common enemy. For these countries, China had no right to get out of its position of poverty by taking advantage of the privileged, shortening the road by using unlawful tricks. For example, China is often accused of doping its companies with state money and making them too powerful, which is unfair for companies from other companies. This same debate also provoked a trade war between the US and the EU, with Boeing and Airbus, but also now the pharmaceuticals that provide the vaccines only for the rich countries have been highly subsidized by the institutions. As such, those tricks that China is accused of using are commonly used by rich countries, but they act as if they had the natural right to do it while others should not.

In the same vein, they act as if they had ever done so and their position of richness was not the fruit of wars, colonization and mutual theft along the last centuries and still today. China is accused of geopolitical influence here and there, and military harassment here and there. The problem seems not to be the particular actions, which have been performed for centuries and are still performed today by rich countries, but the fact that it is China who does it. Or Russia. Not so much because they are dictatorships, but because they are not in the traditional circle of privileged countries with the right to do so. Now, the great nightmare of the rich countries has come true with China : the order has been subverted. Now there is someone in position to challenge them, now they do not have absolute control over the designs of the world. The obvious proof is that China—and also Russia in other spheres—is on the way to provide vaccines to all those countries of the global “South” (Turkey, Philippines, Indonesia, Algeria, etc.) that the rich countries have left in the lurch. They accuse China of doing “geopolitics”, which most certainly is, but at the same time it is also solidarity. Otherwise, the rich countries should be accused of geopolitical ineptitude, which, at the same time, exposes their absence of genuine solidarity. As a consequence, rather than making it possible to produce more vaccines, it is better to articulate a Second Cold War, not to so much to maintain democracy in the world and the wellbeing of those countries in need, as to keep the position of superiority of those in privilege and make China submit and return to the place of subordination where it belongs.

[1] https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/01/28/vaccine-nationalism-means-that-poor-countries-will-be-left-behind?fsrc=gp_en

The Coronavirus crisis as interregnum - La crisis del coronavirus como interregnum

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado — 2020-04-12T09:04:41Z

Abstract
The coronavirus crisis is changing more aspects of the status quo than the purely economic ones commonly stated. In this article I discuss my travel experience in India during the outbreak of the pandemic, which I accompany with reflections on the identity and antagonistic effects it is provoking. A mixture of ignorance and fear in face of the invisible enemy is causing in many parts of the world the rejection of people from countries of the so-called first world : a new experience for many. The foreigner, no matter from which nationality, and even the compatriot coming from “abroad” are adopting the role of the enemy/virus within the dangerous warmonger narrative unleashed during the pandemic. There is a temporary mutation in the perceived passport value, as a paper element that underpins the way we evaluate individuals outside their borders. But the coronavirus crisis has shaken the sense identity for many not only when abroad but also when in the homeland, at a time of interregnum when the old is dead and citizens feel lost in the absence of a clear and unifying hegemonic project. For instance, the European Union has failed to exercise its supranational role and has left the solution to the crisis in the hands of local nationalism as traditional constructor of subjectivities, whereas China and the Chinese has become the preferred target of antagonism, the number one public enemy, with dangerous ramifications and implications for the post-coronavirus future.

The Coronavirus crisis as interregnum

How long will the foreigner be suspected of bringing/being a virus ? Does warmongering language help “combat” the invisible virus, or does also the role of the enemy surreptitiously extend to foreign and even countrymen enemies ? Until when will the way of travelling change ? Is it the final stab of nationalism over globalization ? Will this be a point of no return in constructing China as the hated enemy ?

At the beginning of the crisis, when the virus had not officially left Wuhan or had only anecdotally done so transported by people who had been in that city, the problem was localized and seemed somewhat remote and foreign. Like when we see the news of a natural catastrophe or a war in a country sited on another continent from the bubble constructed by the remotely controlled TV in our living room : the emotional distance made it difficult for us to mobilize and feel the rush of the situation. That did not happen in countries like Taiwan, which being so close to the outbreak and having previous experiences with coronavirus, soon set to work to prevent a catastrophe that at the time seemed implausible to most of the rest of the world. For a few weeks, reassured by the data showing the restrained lethality of the virus, I could never imagine that the situation would turn out to be one of world paralysis, social panic, and a change in the global status quo.

I heard the first news of the coronavirus when I was backpacking in Saudi Arabia during the Chinese New Year holidays. From dictatorship to dictatorship, I was struck by the forcefulness of the measures taken in Wuhan : something like that could never work in Europe because our societies would never go through the hoop, I contended. From the Middle East, my Taiwanese girlfriend and I moved to India just some days before the virus made its appearance in many other countries and we began to understand that the problem was not so much the lethality of the virus as its high transmission rate and how poorly prepared we were for a health crisis of such a magnitude. Caught in this context, we decided to stop our trip in a certain place and wait there as long as necessary until the situation cleared up, which by then we thought would not take more than a month. We acted this way because, at that time, it seemed more dangerous to use public transportation, transiting through airports in Asia and embarking on international flights, than staying in a small touristy town in India. The virus could be anywhere, better not to move and stay inside the hotel as much as possible. In fact, by then in India there were only three imported cases in the south, while in Taiwan and Spain the number of cases and the sense of danger grew day by day. So we found a budget hotel in Pushkar and set out.

After three days I woke up with a Whatsapp message from the hotel owner, saying that the police, along with doctors, had gone to the hostels in the town warning the owners that citizens of 15 countries (including Taiwan but not Spain, although Spain already had more confirmed cases) could not be accommodated and had to be rejected upon check-in. When I read that message it seemed to me a funny nonsense that would solve itself just having patience : this is how we solved most problems in India's organized chaos. But it was not the case, and soon after we were expelled from that hotel without further information, not knowing what to do or where to go. So, being suspects of having the coronavirus—even though we had already been in India for three weeks—, we were forced to leave our hotel and roam the street, use public transport to get to the local hospital (where they did not now what to do with us), then the police station, and to a nearby city (Ajmer) with a larger hospital, where we had to wait for one hour in the emergency room after the doctor there told us that he did not know how to proceed but that he would call the authorities to inquire. Finally, they moved us to an improvised “Coronavirus Isolation Ward” where another doctor gave us a poorly designed “health certificate” that allegedly would allow us to enter hotels again. He just checked our blood pressure and auscultated our lungs but did not even check our temperature. We went back to Pushkar, searched for another hostel, and continued with our plan of staying there as long as necessary. As I will explain later, that health certificate almost ended up being a condemnation rather than a solution.

But before, I will talk about the anecdote when arriving at the police station. As soon as I entered, the officer who saw me arrive did not ask me what I needed or how he could help me. No. The first thing he did, before even uttering a greeting, was to ask me why I was not wearing a mask. It shocked me because nobody around us was wearing one, including him, so why should I wear it ? At that moment my morning suspicion was confirmed : for the authorities we were nothing more than a danger. We were the virus. Our first-world money and my white face ceased to be a wild card, a safe-conduct that opened doors and provided a favourable treatment : it neither prevented us from being expelled from the hotel nor did it compensate for the sense of danger that my presence suddenly caused. This was a paradigm shift on my own perceived identity. The reason seemed to be that the previous day 14 Italians had been detected positive in New Delhi, as did another Italian in Jaipur two days before that, after being all them travelling in the region where we were by then, Rajasthan. Measures against foreigners were progressively enacted in this and other regions of the country.

I told the police officer that I did not wear a mask because there was no reason why I would need it more than he did, since I had no symptoms of the coronavirus and had been in India for three weeks, while the incubation period was said to be only two. Naive enough, I thought that reasoning about the scientific consensus regarding the virus would make him see reason. When they saw my Taiwanese girlfriend arrive the fear was even greater. They literally kicked us out of the officers' room where we were having our conversation. “Taiwan problem, virus, very dangerous”, said that officer in poor English, next to the exit door of the station. “But we have not been to Taiwan in the last three months ! What is actually dangerous, Taiwan or the Taiwanese passport ?”, I replied. This and other questions were translated to the officer by some people around us, from a safe distance, none of them daring to get close. Again, reasoning was useless ; the officer invited us to go to Jaipur, a city about five hours from there, where we would have to travel by public transport mixed with dozens of local travellers that could be infected if we really were that dangerous. It obviously was not an issue about preventing the spread of the virus, it was just ignorance from the higher authorities and fear of not following suit by the public workers. They just wanted us to leave. Rather than kicking us out of the hotels and get us moving, they should have asked us to please not move from the room and send a doctor to check our state of health. Ignorance and fear were a bad combination. And since the virus could not be seen with the naked eye but foreigners did, we became the problem. Interestingly, in India the majority of positive cases to date were Indians who had returned from abroad, while at Indian airports and train and bus stations 99% of the passengers were Indians (as foreigners were prohibited from travelling to the country since weeks before and many had already returned to their countries of origin). Nonetheless, foreigners were the only ones clearly identifiable as elements of risk.

The following day we began to experience some adults yelling “corona !” when they saw us pass, together with a few people mentioning “coronavirus” whenever we walked near them. The first time it happened, surprised, I faced the shopkeeper who shouted “corona !” from the entrance of a souvenir shop in Pushkar. What a way to bite the hand that feeds you, I thought. Very upset, I tried to make him see the inadequacy of his yelling “corona !” when he saw my girlfriend pass in front of his store. He poorly defended himself up affirming that he had yelled it out to the shopkeeper in the nearby store, but taking me for a jerk instead of apologizing did not help quell my anger. The people who passed by the street, mostly locals, stopped to listen to my recriminations against the shopkeeper, until a passer-by intervened : “but do you have the coronavirus or not ?”, he asked. “Of course not !”, I replied, incredulous at such an inappropriate question. “Then, if you don't have the virus, there is no reason to get angry if people shout “corona” at you !”, he stated without blinking an eye. Call me naïve, but I was expecting people to support us and his intervention felt to me as a cold jar of water. We just left there starting to feel more scared than angry.

The first days of March we heard people calling us “corona” once or twice a day. After a week we had to put up with it once or twice every five minutes, including children who were already imitating the behaviour of adults. That verbal violence that identified us as suspicious viruses added to all the people who covered their mouths and noses when they saw us nearby, women who ran away when we entered the alley where they were doing their duties, or groups of young people who asked us about our nationality and then made comments where the word “coronavirus” would invariably be present. After two weeks we were already thinking twice about going outside and we were afraid of how the situation in India could evolve if the pandemic finally broke out there. On one occasion I decided to face a group of young men, who greeted us with the cry of “coronavirus !” when they saw us in the distance : while one of them tried to calm the situation and apologized saying that we were his guests, another of them responded in a violent way that we better get away from his city and his country, right away, while the rest of the youngsters around him remained silent. There was a fascinating level of complacency with those who disqualified foreigners, especially considering that we were in popular destinations where tourist income was essential to the local economy. After two weeks we decided to buy the first cheap flight that we found, for the following week, and return to Taiwan because in Spain the situation was already running wild.

However, three days before our first flight, to Delhi, we experienced a tension escalation of such magnitude that it led us to change it for the very following morning. We were in a hotel to which we had been admitted with the health certificate we had obtained two weeks before in Ajmer. In such certificate, at the top it was written “shift to isolation / for coronavirus screening” and, under that title, there were a multitude of medical notes including our data on blood pressure, negative in cough, negative in fever (although they never tested it), and a brief conclusion of the analysis as a “N” surrounded by a circle which I, not being a doctor, understood as “negative” in coronavirus. However, ignorance and fear once again, caused the hotel owner to look exclusively at the phrase “shift to isolation / for coronavirus ...” and ignore everything else. Against all logic, he concluded that we were positive for coronavirus. What is more, he, and the ones who followed, did not consider that even in the case we had been positive two weeks before in Ajmer and put into isolation, if now we were there is because we should have cured. But no, they believed we were still positive right then, and so they treated us. That opened new questions : how long does the stigma of having coronavirus last for those who suffered it ? Will people treat me differently when I return to Taiwan, even after passing my quarantine, if they suspect that I may have had coronavirus abroad ? The hotelier called the police, who went to the hotel and from a meter away checked our health certificate and told us that we had to go to the local hospital, while mentioning “positive in coronavirus”. “Are you a doctor to understand what that document says ?”, I uttered incredulously. But complaining or reasoning was absolutely useless. We dressed up and took the essentials to go into the unknown, certainly worried about what would happen that night.

Our fears were not unfounded. Upon arrival at the hospital we were greeted from two metres away by a doctor with an unwelcoming expression on his face. As my Taiwanese girlfriend sat outside, I was invited to sit in a wooden chair in a corner of the doctor's office. There I sensed how the doctor was discussing on the phone with someone about the nationality of my girlfriend : “China, Taiwan”, he insisted a couple of times. I interrupted to tell him that it was not China, that it was Taiwan and that these were two different countries, knowing that for them having a person of Chinese nationality in their town was little less than having a horseman of the Apocalypse as a guest to the table. Of course, my clarification was useless. “Republic of China, China”, the doctor repeated over the phone. “Republic of China is Taiwan, and People's Republic of China, is China, different countries”, I insisted, not because I had any interest in discussing with that man about diplomatic affairs, but because I understood that at that time having a passport from one state or another could mean the difference between spending some time in quarantine in that creepy hospital or going back to safety. Again, we were dealing with ignorance and fear, so small details like being Chinese or not could mean a world. Actually, had they used the logic, they would have deducted that the problem was Spain, where the cases were skyrocketing, and not my companion from Taiwan, an exemplary country in handling the crisis. The doctor asked if I had a fever, cough, or muscle pain, I answered to everything and he asked me to sit outside again. Two English men in their sixties had arrived there looking for a health certificate as well, entered the office and left three minutes later with their signed medical certificate, back to their hotel.

As for we, thirty minutes later we still had not received any explanation of what we were waiting for. It was already nine o'clock at night when I stood up and asked the doctor what the problem was. The doctor, about five meters away, shouted manifestly angry that the health certificate we were carrying stated that we had tested positive for coronavirus. He asked me (although it sounded more as an accusation) how long we had been in isolation. I replied that 30 minutes until the doctor came and completed the certificate he had in his hands, stating that we had given a negative after screening. He did not believe me, nor could I believe that he, a doctor, fell into the same obvious mistakes of extreme ignorance as the hotelier and the police officer. He proclaimed that the certificate said we were positive and we were waiting for a “medical team” to arrive, and turned around.

A few minutes later, a worker from our hotel who was accompanying us asked me for our room key. Why ?, because the police were going to take our things from there and they were going to seal the room. What impotence we felt ! “You cannot touch my things, you have no right and should wait until we return”, I demanded. An hour or more passed until the doctor, perhaps tired of waiting for a “medical team” that never came, asked my girlfriend the same questions about whether she had had a fever, cough, and so on. She answered “no” to everything, he then asked if she was sure and, after all, he wrote “no, no, no” on a paper, signed it, and let us go. We went back to the hotel and waited about another hour for the police to return to unseal the hotel (yes, they eventually sealed the whole hotel) and to recover our luggage from inside the room. Around 15 people arrived, among them two members from the government's board of tourism apologizing for the misunderstanding and informing us that anyway we had to find another hotel for the night. Despite the bad news, they were the first ones to treat us with certain dignity that night. We arrived to a new hotel after midnight, not being able to eat anything since lunch. We were angry and hungry but, above all, happy that we had a bed to spend the night in a safe place. The first thing we did was to change our flight to Delhi for a few hours later that very same morning, and then buy a new flight to Taiwan for the following day. We were lucky because after that day flying became an impossible mission and India was lockdown for, at least, three weeks by now.

To top off our odyssey, on the day of our flight to Taiwan I felt I had minimal chances of getting on board, as I did not carry my Taiwanese residence permit with me and the country had banned three days before the arrival of non-resident foreigners. At least, we thought, my girlfriend for sure could escape the country and that felt as an enormous improvement. We called the Taiwan office in New Delhi and, after consulting with the authorities, they called us back several hours later claiming that they could not do anything to help me. An administrative of my university in Taiwan also double-checked with the Taiwan immigration office about my situation and received the same refusal as a response : without a physical residence permit it was not possible to travel. I only had a digital copy that, just to make things more complex, included the number of my old passport which I had renewed on my recent visit to Spain. So I stood at the Delhi airport with the city on lockdown and with no hope of being allowed to board my flight. Fortunately, we had purchased the last two seats of the last direct flight to Taiwan that would be available for a long time, and with “China” Airlines, paradoxically a Taiwanese company. If there was a possibility that they would let me board without the proper documents, I contended, it was with a national airline and a direct flight (if I had to stop in another country they would never let me get on the plane without the required documentation for my destination). The airline's chief operating officer was a very correct Taiwanese man who sent images of my documentation via an online messaging app directly to Taiwan's immigration officials. Two hours later, after a good number of questions and against all odds, I was allowed to fly. Until I set foot in Taiwan and the authorities let me in I could not believe that bureaucrats could be so humane when it comes to relaxing rules, even more when we were in the midst of a global pandemic and I was a foreign national. The news that came days after from foreigners who were stuck in India were terrible : assaults on the street, expelled or rejected from hotels, difficulties finding food…

This is the story of an adventure that, beyond anecdotes, gives rise to questioning in what sense our societies are changing. How long will the foreigner be suspected of bringing/being a virus ? Until now, in most societies only foreigners with certain ethnic traits suspected of coming from poorer countries than the country in question were looked down upon. However, post-coronavirus racism has turned the tables and the undesirables have also become people with good purchasing power who until now travelled the world as they pleased : Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese, Spanish, Italian... or any other citizen who could easily be confused with the stereotype of these ethnic characteristics, whatever the true nationality of their passport. Thus, many Indians confessed to me on social media, afflicted, that being from areas of northern India they had suffered the same harassment and identification with the virus because of their East Asian features.

How long will the foreigner be a suspect ? For how long will the way of travelling change ? Let's imagine that the coronavirus has come to stay for at least a couple of years, with successive outbreaks here and there, until a vaccine is validated and applied globally. It would be no surprise that mandatory two-week quarantines upon arrival in a new country become the norm. Who is going to plan a trip in that context ? Moreover, it would not be surprising that many withdrawn from travelling due to the risk of being stranded in a distant country in the event of an outbreak while they are abroad. International flights will be reinstated, of that there is no doubt, but the fear of the foreign and of being away from home has been indelibly recorded for many. The same security paranoia that was experienced in airports after 9/11 will now be experienced after Covid-19, and explosive material detectors will be exchanged for thermometers, whereas police dogs will be substituted by doctors in white coats, masks and surgical gloves. And even if someone dares to travel after all, will they travel again after they felt that being the foreigner one is suspected not of carrying a virus but of being the virus itself ?

The warmongering language used by the institutions to “fight” the virus, together with the fear in face of an invisible enemy that we cannot identify with the naked eye or point out on the street, is leading to an association between foreigners and viruses, between the “Other” and the enemy. It has even reached a point in which citizens fear and reject fellow citizens from highly affected regions of the same country or from abroad. In Germany, French citizens from regions near the border highly affected by the virus have been attacked and abused. In Spain there has been an unofficial campaign on social media against people from Madrid allegedly moving to other parts of the country, treating them as viruses independently of whether they were infected or not. The judiciary even had to act against rumours accusing certain well-known family of having travelled to other city when they had actually remained in Madrid. It is logical to think that in the face of antagonistic discourses that place “us” against the invisible enemy, a visceral need emerges to identify that enemy in a material way, to make it more real, more tangible : more human. In our personal travel anecdote we also experienced that : my Taiwanese girlfriend received several messages on social media from other Taiwanese furiously requesting her not to return to the homeland, so she would not bring the dangerous virus with her. The discourses blaming other nations, particularly China, are also creating a legitimizing basis for racism against the citizens of that country. As if that was not in itself regrettable enough, generalized ignorance leads to equating every person with oriental features to this “Chinese enemy”. It may be something that might surprise many in East Asia, but in Europe practically no one is able to differentiate between a Japanese, a Korean, a Chinese or a Vietnamese. They all often go, unfortunately, into the same sack.

The virus will die sooner or later but the irresponsible bellicose language against China and the Chinese will endure much longer, threatening to become a source of socio-political instability and institutional racism. The struggle for the narrative in the post-coronavirus world between China and the United States exemplifies this new paradigm, with the notorious motto of the “Chinese virus”, the claims of China hiding the real number of victims after the US overcame those numbers, or the repeated accusations of China not informing the rest of the world about how serious the virus was (despite they had confined a 11 million people city as early as January 23rd and while all media described the alleged situation of apocalypse China was then living). As do the ubiquitous criticisms and suspicions with which China's health aid is received by many countries. If China helps, it always helps badly, with defective products ; if China doesn't help, it is because they are irresponsible after the chaos they have “created” ; if it helps well and for free, it does so only to gain geopolitical power and for mere self-interest ; if it helps well and obtains money from it, it is evil because on top of having spread the “Chinese virus” all over the planet now they want to do business with it. I have read news in serious media arguing each of these criticisms. In this interregnum, China has become the scapegoat for many : no matter what it does, it will always be accused and blamed. Besides our personal opinion regarding the Chinese regime, it deserves to be mentioned the amount of conspiracies and invective relying on biased or directly false information that are circulating against China, the Chinese government and the Chinese people. It seems rather that in the face of a post-globalization scenario in which China is placing itself in the best starting point, the seed of hatred already existing against the Chinese has finished hatching. I think there are many reasons to criticize China, but the way it is currently being done threatens to create racial antagonisms that will only fan the flames of violent nationalism (fascism ?) on both sides.

Globalization had been mortally wounded in 2008. Its detractors ranged from the nationalists clamouring against supranational institutions that limited national sovereignty, to populists claiming against the elites of the neoliberal system that hindered the redistribution of wealth and a greater equality among citizens. The European Union, without going any further, is in check as much or more as it was after the financial crisis and the so-called rescue of Greece. On this occasion, with tens of thousands of deaths, the rich European countries continue to take advantage of moments of crisis (i.e. they enjoy the flight of foreign currency from the countries of Southern Europe and a lower interest rate in public debt while it grows in Southern countries). But this time the public opinion of the societies less favoured can turn upside down. It cannot be understood that the rich countries of the Union, the ones most benefited in times of prosperity by the way the system is designed, hide and avoid all solidarity when the body count increases. The previous imposition of austerity scenarios and the blame on Southern member states for a disadvantage that is more structural than cultural did already fuel certain Eurospecticism, but now that we are not talking about economy but about survival, things can go one step further. Blocking essential medical products at the national level within the common market was an evident sign that what exists now is only a temporary collaboration as long as the—rich—countries feel it benefits them. I shall repeat : it is not a Union but a temporary collaboration. Some in the United Kingdom felt it was not beneficial enough and decided to self-isolate in good will, exemplifying this underlying reality. The Union, to be a real one, must be also financial and tackle risks and crises as one. This would require what Étienne Balibar already mentioned as a new “European citizenship”, which seems to be “impossible to realize” but nonetheless remains “absolutely necessary”. The coronavirus was a great opportunity, like times of “war” are, moments when national identities have historically crystallised through the union of the community against a common enemy, showing solidarity, acting as united demos. I am afraid the European Union lost the best opportunity to construct a common sense of identity that it will ever have ; and without it, the necessary solidarity cannot exist to maintain the viability of the European project. The main problem of the European Union after the coronavirus crisis, hence, will be one of identity construction at all levels.

Facing the virus has required interrupting not only the factories that impelled neoliberalism but also the free movement of citizens across borders. Confinement, as well as the health system's organisation, has been primarily organized on a national scale. This, together with the lack of rapid coordination and aid by the institutions of the European Union, has created the feeling that national states are alone in defending their citizens, at the same time that national identity was strengthened by the antagonistic logic of fighting a war against the external enemy (i.e. the Chinese virus). Similarly as it happened during the recent financial crisis, the massive loss of employment, mistrust in the capitalist system, disappointment towards the traditional parties that most citizens had always relied on, or the negative feelings towards an uncertain future, are all factors that shake the identity of individuals in our societies. For this reason, after this crisis, I contend that we will once again experience a wave of identity reconstruction in several axis, with nationalism and populism struggling for hegemony.

The virus, in short, has affected our brains and hearts as viciously as our lungs. It has been proved that prolonged quarantines cause detrimental and long-lasting effects on people's mental health. We will have to face the effects that the massive social quarantine—with generalized social depression, the fear of an enemy invisible and perceived as foreign, and the pessimism towards a dreary future—can inflict in the identity of our societies. Empathy with foreigners has decreased to disheartening levels (what happened to all those Syrians who were waiting at the Greek border just before this crisis ?), while solidarity between nations has been unsatisfactory to say the least. We are heading towards a Gramscian interregum, where globalisation has died (at least in its social conceptualisation, although economically will last longer despite the foreseeable return of certain industries to the national level) and we are heading towards a new unknown destination. For now, in the fight for hegemony, nationalism starts with the best cards to build the shared social identity that drives its transformative project. It can do so in different ways. A positive one would be the rediscovery of well-understood national sovereignty, legitimizing the social-state and the role of democracy, aimed at greater investment in the public sphere, in strengthening the national welfare system as opposed to a privatizing neoliberalism focused only on the opinion of “the markets”. Likewise, the widespread feeling that the political and economic elites of the neoliberal system have failed us may open a window of opportunity for a constructive populist logic to have something to say. A healthy combination of populism and nationalism would be the best alternative to emerge stronger from this period of uncertainty.

La crisis del coronavirus como interregnum

¿Hasta cuándo será el extranjero sospechoso de traer/ser un virus ? ¿El lenguaje belicista ayuda a “combatir” el virus o también se extiende ese rol del enemigo subrepticiamente hacia el extranjero e incluso enemigos de la misma patria ? ¿Hasta cuándo cambiará la forma de viajar ? ¿Se trata de la puñalada de la victoria del nacionalismo sobre la globalización ? ¿Es este un punto de no retorno en la construcción de China como el odiado enemigo ?

Al principio de la crisis, cuando el virus no había salido oficialmente de Wuhan o solo lo había hecho de manera anecdótica, transportado a otras zonas por medio de personas que habían estado en esa ciudad, el problema estaba localizado y parecía algo remoto y ajeno. Como cuando uno desde el salón de su casa ve noticias de una catástrofe natural en un país de otro continente, la distancia emocional hace difícil que nos movilicemos y sintamos la premura de la situación. Eso no sucedió en países como Taiwán, que estando tan cerca y teniendo experiencias previas similares se puso pronto manos a la obra para prevenir una catástrofe que por entonces parecía inverosímil para la mayoría del resto del mundo. Durante algunas semanas, yo mismo, tranquilizado por los datos que mostraban la letalidad comedida del virus, nunca pude imaginar que la situación llegaría a ser una de paralización mundial, pánico social y cambio del status quo.

Las primeras noticias del coronavirus me llegaron durante las vacaciones del año nuevo chino, mientras estaba de viaje en Arabia Saudí. De dictadura a dictadura me chocó la contundencia de las medidas que se tomaron en China : algo así jamás podría suceder en occidente, defendí. Desde Oriente Medio viajé a India junto a mi novia Taiwanesa, pocos días antes de que el virus hiciera su aparición en multitud de otros países y empezáramos a comprender que el problema no era tanto la letalidad del virus como su elevado ratio de transmisión y lo poco preparados que estábamos para una crisis sanitaria de tal magnitud. Atrapados en este nuevo contexto, decidimos detener nuestro viaje en una localización determinada y esperar allí tanto tiempo como fuera necesario hasta que la situación se aclarase, que por entonces calculábamos que sería poco más de un mes. Lo hicimos así porque por entonces lo más peligroso parecía moverse en transporte público, embarcarse en vuelos internacionales y hacer escalas por varios aeropuertos de Asia. El virus podía estar en cualquier parte, mejor no moverse y permanecer dentro del hotel tanto como fuera posible. De hecho, en India solo había tres casos importados en el sur, mientras que en Taiwán y España el número de casos y la sensación de peligro crecían día a día. Así pues, encontramos un hostal barato y nos instalamos en Pushkar.

Al cabo de tres días me desperté con un mensaje de WhatsApp del dueño del hotel, que decía que la policía, junto con doctores, había acudido a los hoteles de la ciudad advirtiendo que los ciudadanos de 15 países (entre los que se incluía Taiwán pero no España, a pesar de que España tenía más casos confirmados) no podían ser alojados y debían ser rechazados. Cuando lo leí me pareció un gracioso disparate que terminaría arreglándose por sí mismo con un poco de paciencia : así es como se solucionaban la mayoría de problemas en el habitual caos organizado de India. Pero no fue así, y poco después fuimos expulsados del hotel sin mayor información, sin saber qué hacer ni a dónde ir. Así pues, sospechosos de tener el coronavirus—a pesar de que ya llevábamos tres semanas en India—, nos vimos obligados a abandonar el hotel y errar por las calles, utilizar transporte público para ir a buscarnos la vida al hospital local (donde no tenían ni idea de qué hacer con nosotros), a la estación de policía, e incluso a otra ciudad cercana (Ajmer) con un hospital mejor preparado, donde tuvimos que esperar durante una hora en la sala de urgencias después de que el doctor de allí nos dijera que no sabía cómo proceder pero que llamaría a las autoridades para preguntar. Por fin, nos movieron a una improvisada “Sala de Aislamiento de Coronavirus” donde otro doctor nos dio un pobre “certificado de salud” que supuestamente nos permitiría alojarnos en hoteles nuevamente. Ese médico simplemente nos tomó la tensión y nos auscultó los pulmones, pero ni siquiera comprobó si teníamos fiebre. Regresamos a Pushkar, buscamos otro hostal, y continuamos con nuestro plan de estar allí tanto tiempo como fuese necesario. Como explicare más adelante, aquel certificado de salud casi terminó siendo una condena más que una solución.

Pero antes, hablaré sobre la anécdota al llegar a la comisaría de policía. Nada más entrar, el oficial que me vio llegar no me preguntó qué necesitaba o cómo me podía ayudar. No. Lo primero que hizo, antes de siquiera proferir un saludo, fue preguntarme por qué no llevaba puesta una mas carilla. Me chocó porque nadie a nuestro alrededor llevaba una, incluyéndole a él, así que ¿por qué debía llevarla yo ? En ese instante se confirmó mi sospecha de aquella mañana : para las autoridades no éramos más que un peligro. Nosotros éramos el virus. Nuestro dinero del primer mundo y mi cara blanca dejaron de ser un comodín, un salvoconducto que abría puertas y propiciaba un trato de favor : ni evitó que fuéramos expulsados del hotel ni compensaba por la sensación de peligro que mi presencia de repente provocaba. Era un cambio de paradigma en mi propia percepción identitaria. La razón que parecía estar detrás fue que el día anterior 14 italianos habían sido detectados positivo en Nueva Delhi, igual que otro italiano dos días antes en Jaipur, tras viajar todos ellos por la región donde nosotros estábamos por entonces, Rajastán. Medidas contra los extranjeros fueron progresivamente levantadas en este y otros estados del país.

Le dije al oficial de policía que no llevaba mascarilla porque no existía ninguna razón por la cual la necesitase más que él, pues no tenía síntomas del coronavirus y llevaba tres semanas en India, mientras el período de incubación era de solo dos. Ingenuo de mí, pensé que razonar sobre el consenso científico respecto al virus les haría entrar en razón. Cuando vieron llegar a mi novia Taiwanesa el pánico fue mayor. Literalmente, nos echaron de la oficina donde hasta entonces estábamos. “Taiwan problem, virus, very dangerous”, decía aquel policía en un básico inglés, junto a la puerta de salida de la comisaría. “¡Pero nosotros no hemos estado en Taiwán en los últimos tres meses ! ¿Qué es lo peligroso, Taiwán o el pasaporte Taiwanés ?”, contesté. Ésta y otras preguntas fueron traducidas al oficial por algunas personas a nuestro alrededor, desde una distancia segura, ninguna de ellas se atreviéndose a acercarse demasiado. De nuevo, razonar era inútil ; el oficial nos invitó a irnos hasta Jaipur, ciudad a unas cinco horas de allí a la que tendríamos que trasladarnos en transporte público, mezclados con decenas de viajeros locales que podrían ser infectados si realmente éramos tan peligrosos. Obviamente no se trataba de prevenir la expansión del virus, sino de mera ignorancia de las autoridades y de miedo a no actuar acorde a ellas por parte de los trabajadores públicos. Solo querían que nos fuéramos de allí. Más que expulsarnos de los hoteles y ponernos en movimiento, deberían habernos pedido que por favor no nos moviéramos de nuestra habitación y enviado un médico a comprobar nuestro estado de salud. Ignorancia y miedo, mala combinación. Y como el virus no se veía pero a los extranjeros sí, nos convertimos en el problema. Curiosamente, en India la mayoría de casos positivos hasta la fecha eran indios que habían regresado del extranjero, al mismo tiempo que en aeropuertos y estaciones de tren y autobús un 99% de los pasajeros eran indios (pues los extranjeros tenían prohibido viajar a India desde semanas atrás y muchos de los que había en el país ya habían regresado a sus países de origen). Pese a todo, los extranjeros éramos los únicos claramente identificables como elementos de riesgo.

El día siguiente empezamos a advertir cómo algunos adultos gritaban “¡corona !” al vernos pasar, así como gente mencionando “coronavirus” cuando caminábamos en sus cercanías. La primera vez que ocurrió me encaré con el hombre que profirió tal acusación, tendero en una tienda de souvenirs de Pushkar. Vaya manera de morder la mano que te da de comer, pensé. Muy molesto, le intenté hacer ver lo inadecuado de su grito al ver a mi novia pasar por delante de su tienda. Él se escudó argumentando que se lo había gritado al tendero de la tienda de al lado, pero tomarme por imbécil en vez de disculparse no ayudó a aplacar mi enojo. Las personas que pasaban por la calle, en su mayoría locales, se detuvieron para escuchar mis recriminaciones al tendero, hasta que un transeúnte intervino : “¿pero tenéis el coronavirus o no ?”, preguntó. “¡Por supuesto que no !”, contesté, incrédulo ante una pregunta tan poco pertinente. “¡Si no tenéis el coronavirus no hay motivo para enojarse si te gritan corona !”, concluyó aquel hombre sin pestañear. Llámame inocente, pero tenía la esperanza de que la gente nos apoyaría y aquella intervención se sintió como una jarra de agua fría. Nos largamos de allí comenzando a sentir más pavor que enfado.

Los primeros días de marzo escuchábamos a la gente llamarnos “corona” una o dos veces al día. Al cabo de una semana teníamos que aguantarlo una o dos veces cada cinco minutos, incluyendo ya a niños que imitaban el comportamiento de los adultos. Esa violencia verbal que nos identificaba como a virus sospechosos se añadía a toda la gente que se tapaba boca y nariz al vernos alrededor, a mujeres que salían corriendo cuando nos adentrábamos en el callejón donde hacían sus labores, o a grupos de jóvenes que nos preguntaban por nuestra nacionalidad para luego hacer comentarios donde invariablemente la palabra “coronavirus” estaría presente. Al cabo de dos semanas ya nos lo pensábamos dos veces antes de salir a la calle y teníamos miedo de cómo podría evolucionar la situación en India si la pandemia estallaba finalmente allí. En una ocasión me dio por encararme a un grupo de muchachos que nos recibieron al grito de “corona” cuando nos vieron a lo lejos : mientras uno de ellos intentó calmar la situación y se disculpó diciendo que éramos sus invitados, otro de ellos respondió de manera violenta exigiéndonos que nos largásemos de su ciudad y de su país, inmediatamente, mientras el resto de jóvenes junto a él callaban. Existía un fascinante nivel de complacencia con los que descalificaban a los extranjeros, especialmente si consideramos que estábamos en destinos populares donde los ingresos del turismo eran esenciales para la economía local. Tras dos semanas decidimos comprar el primer vuelo económico que encontramos, para la semana siguiente, y regresar a Taiwán pues en España la situación ya se estaba desbocando.

No obstante, tres días antes de nuestro vuelo sufrimos una escalada de tensión de tal magnitud que nos llevó a pagar de nuevo y cambiarlo para la mismísima mañana siguiente. Nos encontrábamos en un hotel al que habíamos sido admitidos con el certificado de salud que habíamos conseguido dos semanas atrás, en otra ciudad de la misma región de Rajasthan. En tal certificado, en la parte superior se leía “shift to isolation / for coronavirus screening”, y debajo de ese título se encontraban multitud de anotaciones médicas entre las que se leía nuestros datos de presión sanguínea, tos negativa, fiebre negativa y, como conclusión del análisis, una “N” rodeada por un círculo que yo, sin ser médico, entendí como “negativo” en coronavirus. Sin embargo, la ignorancia y el miedo, una vez más, hicieron que el dueño del hotel se fijase exclusivamente en la frase “shift to isolation / for coronavirus…” y obviase todo lo demás. Concluyó, contra toda lógica, que “éramos” positivo en coronavirus. No que habíamos sido, no, que éramos. Lo que es más, él y los que siguieron, no consideraron que incluso en el caso de que hubiéramos sido positivos dos semanas antes en Ajmer y nos hubiesen puesto en aislamiento, si ahora nos encontrábamos allí es porque nos habrían dado el alta hospitalaria, curados. Pero no, creían que seguíamos siendo positivos en ese momento, y de tal modo nos trataron. Esto abría nuevas preguntas : ¿cuánto dura el estigma de tener coronavirus para quienes lo sufrieron ? ¿La gente me tratará de manera diferente cuando regrese a Taiwán, incluso después de pasar mi cuarentena, si sospechan que podría haber tenido coronavirus en el extranjero ? El hotelero llamó a la policía, que acudió al hotel y desde un metro de distancia nos indicó que teníamos que acudir al hospital, mientras leía el certificado médico y afirmaba “positive in coronavirus”. “Are you a doctor to understand what that document says ?”, proferí incrédulo. Pero esgrimir quejas o razones no producía efecto alguno. Nos vestimos con lo primero que pillamos y agarramos lo esencial para marchar a lo desconocido, ciertamente preocupado por lo que pudiera suceder aquella noche.

Nuestros temores no eran infundados. Al llegar al hospital nos recibió desde dos metros de distancia un doctor con cara de pocos amigos. Mientras mi novia taiwanesa se sentaba afuera, yo fui invitado a sentarme en una silla de madera situada en una esquina de la consulta del médico. Allí intuí cómo el médico discutía por teléfono con alguien sobre la nacionalidad de mi novia : “China, Taiwán”, afirmó un par de veces. Interrumpí para decirle que no era China, que era Taiwán y que eran dos países diferentes, a sabiendas de que para ellos el hecho de tener a una persona de nacionalidad china en su pueblo era poco menos que tener un jinete del apocalipsis como invitado a la mesa. Por supuesto, mi aclaración no sirvió de nada. “Republic of China, China”, repetía el doctor por teléfono. “Republic of China is Taiwan, People's Republic of China, is China, different countires”, aclaré, no por interés en discutir con aquel hombre sobre asuntos diplomáticos, sino porque entendí que en aquel momento tener un pasaporte de uno u otro estado podía marcar la diferencia entre pasar tiempo en cuarentena en aquel espeluznante hospital o regresar a un lugar seguro. De nuevo, lidiábamos con ignorancia y miedo, por lo que pequeños detalles como ser chino o no podían significar un mundo. En realidad, si hubieran seguido la lógica verían que el problema era yo como español, donde los casos estaban disparándose, y no mi compañera de Taiwán, país ejemplar a la hora de manejar la crisis. El doctor me preguntó si tenía fiebre, tos o dolor muscular, contesté a todo que no y me pidió que me sentara afuera nuevamente. Allí habían llegaron dos ingleses de unos sesenta años, que entraron en la consulta a continuación y salieron de allí cinco minutos después con su certificado médico firmado, de vuelta a su hotel.

Por nuestra parte, treinta minutos después aún no habíamos recibido ninguna explicación de a qué estábamos aguardando. Eran ya las nueve de la noche cuando me levanté y le pregunté al doctor cuál era el problema. Éste, a unos cinco metros de distancia, gritó manifiestamente enfadado que en el certificado de salud que portábamos ponía que habíamos dado positivo en coronavirus. Me preguntó (aunque sonó más como una acusación) cuánto tiempo habíamos estado en aislamiento. Le contesté que 30 minutos hasta que vino el médico y completó el certificado que tenía en sus manos, el cual manifestaba un negativo tras el análisis. Ni él me creyó a mí, ni yo podía creer que él, médico, cayera en el mismo error de suma ignorancia que el dueño del hotel y el policía. Exclamó que el certificado decía que éramos positivos y que estábamos esperando a que llegase un “equipo médico”.

Minutos después, un trabajador de nuestro hotel que nos acompañaba me pidió la llave de nuestra habitación. ¿Por qué ?, porque la policía iba a sacar nuestras cosas de allí e iba a clausurarla. ¡Qué impotencia sentí ! “No podéis tocar mis cosas, no tenéis derecho”, demandé. Mas de una hora transcurrió hasta que el doctor, quizá harto de esperar al equipo médico que nunca llegó, le hizo las mismas preguntas a mi novia sobre si tenía fiebre, tos, etc. Contestó a todo que no, le preguntó entonces si estaba segura y, después de todo, apuntó “no, no, no” en un papel, firmó, y nos dejó marchar. Regresamos al hotel y allí esperaríamos cerca de otra hora más a que regresara la policía a desprecintar el hotel (sí, finalmente precintaron el hotel entero) y poder recuperar nuestro equipaje. Llegaron unas 15 personas, entre ellas dos miembros de la junta de turismo del gobierno que se disculparon por el malentendido y nos informaron que de todos modos teníamos que encontrar otro hotel para pasar la noche. A pesar de las malas noticias, fueron los primeros en tratarnos con cierta dignidad esa noche. Llegamos a un nuevo hotel después de la medianoche, no habiendo comido nada desde el almuerzo. Estábamos enojados y hambrientos pero, sobre todo, felices de tener una cama para pasar la noche en un lugar seguro. Lo primero que hicimos fue cambiar nuestro vuelo hacia Delhi para unas horas más tarde esa misma mañana, y luego comprar un nuevo vuelo a Taiwán para el día siguiente. Tuvimos suerte porque después de ese día volar se convirtió en una misión imposible e India estuvo en confinamiento durante al menos tres semanas.

Para rematar nuestra odisea, el día de nuestro vuelo a Taiwán existían mínimas posibilidades de subir a bordo, ya que no portaba mi permiso de residencia taiwanés y el país había prohibido tres días antes la llegada de extranjeros no residentes. Al menos, recapacitamos, mi novia seguro que podría escapar del país y eso supondría un gran alivio. Llamamos a la oficina de Taiwán en Nueva Delhi y, después de consultar con las autoridades competentes, nos volvieron a llamar varias horas más tarde alegando que no podían hacer nada para ayudarme. Un administrativo de mi universidad en Taiwán también verificó varias veces con la oficina de inmigración de Taiwán sobre mi situación y recibió la misma negativa como respuesta : sin un permiso de residencia físico no era posible viajar. Yo solo tenía una copia digital que, para hacer las cosas más complejas, incluía el número de mi antiguo pasaporte, el cual había renovado en mi reciente visita a España. Así que me planté en el aeropuerto de Delhi con la ciudad bloqueada y sin esperanza de que me permitieran abordar mi vuelo. Afortunadamente, habíamos comprado los dos últimos asientos del último vuelo directo a Taiwán que estaría disponible durante mucho tiempo, y con “China” Airlines, paradójicamente, una compañía taiwanesa. Si existía una posibilidad de que me dejaran bolar sin los documentos adecuados, sostuve, era con una aerolínea nacional y un vuelo directo (pues si tuviera que hacer escala en otro país nunca me dejarían subir al avión sin la autorización requerida en destino). El director de operaciones de la aerolínea era un hombre taiwanés muy correcto que envió imágenes de mi documentación a través de una aplicación de mensajería online directamente a los funcionarios de inmigración de Taiwán. Dos horas después, tras de un buen número de preguntas y contra todo pronóstico, me permitieron volar. Hasta que puse un pie en Taiwán y me aceptaron en el país no pude creer que los burócratas pudieran ser tan humanos cuando se trata de relajar las reglas, aún más cuando estábamos en medio de una pandemia global y yo era un ciudadano foráneo. Las noticias que llegaron días después de los extranjeros atrapados en India eran terribles : asaltos en la calle, expulsados o rechazados de los hoteles, dificultades para encontrar comida...

Esta es la historia de una aventura que, más allá de las anécdotas, genera interrogantes sobre la dirección hacia la que están cambiando nuestras sociedades. ¿Cuánto tiempo se sospechará que el extranjero traiga/sea un virus ? Hasta ahora, en la mayoría de las sociedades solo se despreciaba a los extranjeros con ciertos rasgos étnicos sospechosos de provenir de países más pobres que el país en cuestión. Sin embargo, el racismo post- coronavirus ha cambiado las tornas y los indeseables también han pasado a ser personas con buen poder adquisitivo que hasta ahora viajaban por el mundo a placer : japoneses, coreanos, taiwaneses, chinos, españoles, italianos... o cualquier otro ciudadano que podría confundirse fácilmente con el estereotipo de esas características étnicas, cualquiera sea la nacionalidad efectiva de su pasaporte. Así pues, muchos indios me confesaron en las redes sociales, afligidos, que al ser de áreas del norte de la India habían sufrido el mismo hostigamiento e identificación con el virus debido a sus características étnicas del Este de Asia.

¿Cuánto tiempo será sospechoso el extranjero ? ¿Por cuánto tiempo cambiará la forma de viajar ? Imaginemos que el coronavirus ha venido para permaner durante al menos un par de años, con brotes sucesivos aquí y allá, hasta que una vacuna sea validada y aplicada a nivel mundial. No sería sorprendente que las cuarentenas obligatorias de dos semanas a la llegada a un nuevo país se conviertan en la norma. ¿Quién va a planear un viaje en ese contexto ? Además, no sería sorprendente que muchos se abstengan de viajar debido al riesgo de quedarse varados en un país distante en caso de que surja un brote mientras están en el extranjero. Se restablecerán los vuelos internacionales, de eso no hay duda, pero el miedo al extranjero y a estar lejos de casa se ha registrado indeleblemente para muchos. La misma paranoia de seguridad que se experimentó en los aeropuertos tras del 11 de septiembre ahora se experimentará tras el Covid-19, y los detectores de materiales explosivos se cambiarán por termómetros, mientras que los perros policías serán sustituidos por médicos con batas blancas, máscaras y guantes quirúrgicos. E incluso si alguien se atreve a viajar al final, ¿repetirá tras sentir que por ser extranjero se sospecha no ya que sea portador de un virus sino que sea el virus mismo ?

El lenguaje belicista empleado desde las instituciones para “combatir” el virus, unido al miedo ante un ente invisible al que no podemos identificar a simple vista ni señalar por la calle, está desembocando en una asociación entre extranjeros y virus, entre el “Otro” y el enemigo. Ésta dinámica ha llegado a un punto en el que los ciudadanos temen y rechazan a los conciudadanos de regiones altamente afectadas del mismo país o del extranjero. En Alemania se ha agredido y vejado a ciudadanos franceses de regiones aledañas a la frontera altamente afectadas por el virus. En España ha habido una campaña no oficial en las redes sociales contra personas de Madrid que supuestamente se mudaron a otras partes del país, tratándolas como virus independientemente de si estaban infectadas o no. El poder judicial incluso tuvo que actuar contra los rumores que acusaban a cierta conocida familia de haber viajado a otra ciudad cuando en realidad se habían quedado en Madrid. Es lógico pensar que frente a los discursos antagónicos que nos colocan a “nosotros” contra el enemigo invisible, surge una necesidad visceral de identificar a ese enemigo de una manera material, para hacerlo más real, más tangible : más humano. En nuestra anécdota de viaje personal también experimentamos eso : mi novia taiwanesa recibió varios mensajes en las redes sociales de otros taiwaneses que le pedían furiosamente que no regresara a su tierra natal, para que no trajese el virus peligroso consigo. Los discursos que culpan a otras naciones, particularmente a China, también están creando una base legitimadora para el racismo contra los ciudadanos de ese país. Como si eso no fuera en sí lo suficientemente lamentable, la ignorancia generalizada lleva a equiparar a cada persona con rasgos orientales con este “enemigo chino”. Puede ser algo que sorprenda a muchos en el Este de Asia, pero en Europa prácticamente nadie puede diferenciar entre japoneses, coreanos, chinos o vietnamitas. Todos a menudo van, desafortunadamente, al mismo saco.

El virus morirá tarde o temprano, pero el lenguaje belicoso irresponsable contra China y los chinos durará mucho más, amenazando con convertirse en una fuente de inestabilidad sociopolítica y racismo institucional. La lucha por la narrativa en el mundo post-coronavirus entre China y los Estados Unidos ejemplifica este nuevo paradigma, con el famoso lema del “virus chino”, las afirmaciones de que China ocultó el número real de víctimas después de que Estados Unidos superase esos números, o las repetidas acusaciones de que China no informó al resto del mundo sobre la gravedad del virus (a pesar de que habían confinado a una ciudad de 11 millones de personas desde el 23 de enero y que todos los medios describieron entonces la supuesta situación de apocalipsis que vivía China). Al igual que las críticas y sospechas ubicuas con las que muchos países reciben la ayuda sanitaria de China. Si China ayuda, siempre ayuda mal, con productos defectuosos ; si China no ayuda, es porque son irresponsables después del caos que ellos han “creado” ; si ayuda bien y de forma gratuita, lo hace solo para ganar poder geopolítico y por mero interés propio ; si ayuda bien y obtiene dinero por ello, es mala porque además de haber propagado el “virus chino” por todo el planeta ahora quiere sacar rédito económico con él. He leído noticias en medios serios argumentando cada una de estas críticas. En este interregno, China se ha convertido en el chivo expiatorio para muchos : no importa lo que haga, siempre será acusada y culpada. Además de nuestra opinión personal sobre el régimen chino, merece mencionarse la cantidad de conspiraciones e inventivas que se basan en información parcial o directamente falsa que circulan contra China, el gobierno chino y el pueblo chino. Parece más bien que ante un escenario pos-globalización en el que China se está colocando en el mejor punto de partida, la semilla del odio que ya existía contra los chinos ha terminado de eclosionar. Creo que hay muchas razones para criticar a China, pero la forma en que se está haciendo actualmente amenaza con crear antagonismos raciales que solo avivarán las llamas del nacionalismo violento (¿fascismo ?) en ambos bandos.

La globalización había sido herida de muerte ya en 2008. Sus detractores comprendían desde los nacionalistas que clamaban contra las instituciones supranacionales que limitaban la soberanía nacional, hasta los populistas que reclamaban contra las élites del sistema neoliberal que obstaculizaban la redistribución de la riqueza y una mayor igualdad entre los ciudadanos. La Unión Europea, sin ir más lejos, está bajo la lupa tanto o más que después de la crisis financiera y el llamado rescate a Grecia. En esta ocasión, con decenas de miles de muertes, los países europeos ricos continúan aprovechando los momentos de crisis (es decir, disfrutan de la fuga de divisas de los países del sur de Europa y de una tasa de interés más baja en la deuda pública mientras ésta crece en los países del sur). Pero esta vez la opinión pública de las sociedades menos favorecidas puede ponerse patas arriba. No puede entenderse que los países ricos de la Unión, los más beneficiados en tiempos de prosperidad por la forma en que está diseñado el sistema, se escondan y eviten toda solidaridad cuando aumenta el número de víctimas. La imposición previa de escenarios de austeridad y la culpa a los estados miembros del sur de una desventaja que es más estructural que cultural ya alimentó cierto euroespecticismo, pero ahora que no estamos hablando de economía sino de supervivencia, las cosas pueden ir un paso más allá. El bloqueo de productos médicos esenciales a nivel nacional dentro del mercado común fue una señal evidente de que lo que existe ahora es solo una colaboración temporal siempre que los países—ricos—sientan que les beneficia. Repito : no es una Unión, sino una colaboración temporal. Algunos en el Reino Unido sintieron que no era lo suficientemente beneficiosa y decidieron aislarse de buena voluntad, ejemplificando esta realidad subyacente. La Unión, para ser real, debe ser también financiera y abordar los riesgos y las crisis como tal. Esto requeriría lo que Étienne Balibar ya mencionó como una nueva “ciudadanía europea”, que parece ser “imposible de realizar” pero que, sin embargo, sigue siendo “absolutamente necesaria”. El coronavirus ha sido una gran oportunidad, similar a los tiempos de “guerra”, momentos en los que las identidades nacionales se han cristalizado históricamente a través de la unión de la comunidad contra un enemigo común, mostrando solidaridad, actuando como un demos unido. Me temo que la Unión Europea ha perdido la mejor oportunidad para construir un sentido común de identidad que alguna vez tendrá ; y sin ella, no puede existir la solidaridad necesaria para mantener la viabilidad del proyecto europeo. El principal problema de la Unión Europea después de la crisis del coronavirus, por lo tanto, será uno de construcción de identidad a todos los niveles.

Afrontar el virus ha requerido interrumpir no solo las fábricas que impulsan el neoliberalismo sino también la libre circulación de ciudadanos a través de las fronteras. El confinamiento, así como la organización del sistema de salud, se ha organizado principalmente a escala nacional. Esto, junto con la falta de coordinación y ayuda urgente por parte de las instituciones de la Unión Europea, ha creado la sensación de que los estados nacionales están solos en la defensa de sus ciudadanos, al mismo tiempo que la identidad nacional se ha visto fortalecida por la lógica antagónica de pelear una guerra contra el enemigo externo (es decir, el virus chino). De manera similar, como sucedió durante la reciente crisis financiera, la pérdida masiva de empleo, la desconfianza en el sistema capitalista, la decepción hacia los partidos tradicionales en los que la mayoría de los ciudadanos siempre ha confiado, o los sentimientos negativos hacia un futuro incierto, son factores que sacuden la identidad de los ciudadanos en nuestras sociedades. Por esta razón, después de esta crisis, sostengo que volveremos a experimentar una ola de reconstrucción de identidad en varios ejes, con el nacionalismo y el populismo luchando por la hegemonía.

En resumen, el virus ha afectado a nuestros cerebros y corazones con tanta saña como a nuestros pulmones. Se ha demostrado que las cuarentenas prolongadas causan efectos perjudiciales y duraderos en la salud mental de las personas. Tendremos que enfrentar los efectos que la cuarentena social masiva—con depresión social generalizada, miedo a un enemigo invisible y percibido como extranjero, y el fuerte pesimismo hacia un lóbrego futuro—puede infligir en la identidad de nuestras sociedades. La empatía con los extranjeros ha disminuido a niveles desalentadores (¿qué pasó con todos los sirios que esperaban en la frontera griega justo antes de esta crisis ?), mientras que la solidaridad entre las naciones ha sido insatisfactoria como poco. Nos dirigimos hacia un interregum gramsciano, donde la globalización ha muerto (al menos en su conceptualización social, aunque económicamente durará más a pesar del regreso previsible de ciertas industrias al nivel nacional) y nos dirigimos hacia un nuevo destino desconocido. Por ahora, en la lucha por la hegemonía, el nacionalismo comienza con las mejores cartas para construir la identidad social compartida que impulsa su proyecto transformador. Puede hacerlo de diferentes maneras. Uno positivo sería el redescubrimiento de una soberanía nacional bien entendida, legitimando el estado social y el papel de la democracia, dirigida a una mayor inversión en la esfera pública, en el fortalecimiento del sistema de bienestar nacional en lugar de un neoliberalismo privatizador centrado solo en la opinión de “los mercados”. Del mismo modo, el sentimiento generalizado de que las élites políticas y económicas del sistema neoliberal nos han fallado puede abrir una ventana de oportunidad para que una lógica populista constructiva tenga algo que decir. Una combinación saludable de populismo y nacionalismo sería la mejor alternativa para salir fortalecido de este período de incertidumbre.

The movements in Catalonia and Hong Kong : democracy advocacy or examples of global illiberalism ?

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado — 2019-10-31T12:52:00Z

The Catalan independence movement has a new reference : the revolutionary movement of Hong Kong. “We are going to make a Hong Kong !”, groups of people recently cried, exalted as they headed to paralyze Barcelona Airport, imitating what Hong Kong activists had done just days before. The recent incidents in these significantly autonomous regions, Catalonia and Hong Kong, have introduced into the international media agenda the discursive struggle that aims to equate both movements as democratic and liberating, despite the long distance between their spatial and political contexts. The explicit aspiration of the Catalan independence movement to emulate Hong Kong with the assault on the airport and the siege of the police and public places on the streets of Catalonia was just the first step in this direction. The approach began when Catalan independence radicals studied, disseminated and emulated the tactics of the Hong Kong protests, techniques and tactics of confrontation with police forces and infrastructure occupation, with the explicit objective of obtaining immediate international attention. In this sense, they had the expected success. This strategy was confirmed by Elisenda Paluzie, the president of the most important pro-independence civil association in Catalonia, the Catalan National Assembly (ANC), who in recent statements supported a constant mobilization as the one in Hong Kong to weaken the pillars of the Spanish State in Catalonia, while defended that it was precisely the violent incidents what made the Catalan secessionist movement visible in the international media on a continuous basis, making the conflict finally visible. In a similar line talked Albert Botran, representative of the pro-independence party CUP, openly anti-capitalist and anti-establishment. It is worth asking whether visibility in the international media, by itself, confers any sort of legitimacy, or if the versions offered by the press adhere to the facts or to sweetened and romanticized versions of reality.

It seems obvious that some idealized vision of the Catalan pro-independence struggle has reached the international arena, especially when we observe the reaction that a small faction of the Hong Kong movement had soon afterwards. A mass demonstration of support for the Catalan independence movement, which was extensively reported in Spain, was staged in the former British colony on 24 October 2019. According to Ernest Chow, former president of the student union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong in charge of reading the manifesto during that demonstration of support, the cases of Catalonia and Hong Kong had certain similarities, such as them being two territories with a different language and culture, enjoying higher levels of development than those of the rest of their parent countries, and finding themselves “facing the same sad and tragic fate”. In this way, a clear gesture of mutual approach between both causes, self-identified as “struggles against oppression”, had begun. At this initial moment, an analysis of the idealization of these so-called democratic or freedom fighters—a phenomenon on the other hand nothing new— becomes pertinent.

Of course, none of these actors mentioned a word about the different nature of the state enemy they face, Spain and China, as if they were identical political entities and, hence, both cases were comparable. Moreover, the government in Hong Kong is said to be a puppet of China whereas the government in Catalonia is precisely the one promoting independence from the institutions. But just mentioning these otherwise relevant factors, as the Spanish government and Spanish media constantly do, should not be an excuse to foreclose the debate and lead us to dismiss an in-depth analysis of the similarities between the two movements. Because there are many elements in common worth mentioning between the two :

1- Both movements have as one of their main roots the fear of a worse future. The negative mental picture of the future is not only caused by the threat of climate change or the disenchantment with the neoliberal system and the increasing economic inequalities, but also by a fear of losing the position of privilege that its members have maintained in these regions, historically richer than the rest of the state to which they belong. Similarly to Ernest Chow's statements about the higher standards of living of Hong Kong regarding China during the manifesto in Hong Kong, Josep Costa, vice president of the Catalan Parliament, also talked in a similar line on 13 August 2019 : “What happens in Hong Kong teaches us some things, for example, that rich societies can also revolt with all the consequences”. As if that was a positive lesson to be learned. In Catalonia, the wrongly vindicated “right to decide” or “right of self-determination”, merely camouflages the support for the policies of isolationism and ethnic supremacy that have already been seen in the West with Trump or during the Brexit, as well as other actors that use lies to portray a pessimistic economic future due to external factors very far from reality. The promoters of these discourses only hope to cling to their privileges while avoiding economic solidarity with the “other”. The recognition of a purported right of the richest regions to secede from the parent states would only give these privileged regions a perfect excuse to blackmail the rest of the state from their position of domain and the possibility of leaving freely. That would likely cause a disastrous contagion in the rest of the liberal democratic world : from Padania to Babaria, from Alberta to Texas, from Flanders to the Basque Country. It would be the starting shot for an atomization between richer and poorer regions and the annulment of intra-state distributive justice, an essential part for liberal democracy and the welfare state to function in already existing democratic political associations. In the case of Hong Kong, the part protesting for freedom and sovereignty is not precisely that of the underdog, the working classes or the immigrants, but the privileged middle classes and the bourgeoisie that seek to sustain their economic position and privileges after they felt it jeopardized by the decline of Hong Kong and the influence of China. In both cases, Catalonia and Hong Kong, the democracy they pursue is not exactly that of the protection of liberal values, the protection of minorities, and the promotion of social equality, but could look more like that of the nationalist search of ethnic sovereignty, the differentiation of citizenship between the real Catalans and Hong Kongers and the Spaniards and Chinese in their territory, and the reactionary defence of economic supremacy. Similarly, the Catalan movement has received support by a broad social base : the bourgeoisie as well as those exploited by it, all of them articulated under the same hegemonic project of independence. A hegemony that has deceptively been presented as a goal that once reached would benefit everyone equally : a well designed illusion for disenchanted people.

2 – As it has been already implied in the previous paragraph, these movements use a populist logic based on the construction of a victimhood subjectivity, an underdog, antagonizing an evil power bloc. Such subjectivities, “the people” of Catalonia and Hong Kong understood as underdogs, are new identities crystallised over the previously established national identities, also of recent construction. The different groups encompassed around such subjectivities are articulated through the respective hegemonic projects of each movement, by the hand of a very specific series of idealistic empty signifiers (democracy, freedom, self-determination, independence). It is done by placing both China and Spain in the role of the pure enemy, aiming to create a dichotomy between a sanctified people vis-à-vis a vile institutional enemy. David against Goliath without palliatives : the excitement produced by this grandiloquent narrative has already captured the hearts and imaginations of millions of people not only in Catalonia and Hong Kong, but also in the rest of the world. But equating the current Spanish state with Franco's dictatorship, or the Chinese government with Hitler's nazi regime (“Nazichina”), is just a discursive trick to sell a Manichaean portrait of the enemy, simplistic and easily digestible by all those who want to believe in the lie of the national moral superiority. It is an infantile chain of equivalence, sheer wishful-thinking and self-delusion, which nevertheless is believed on tiptoe by large social groups that have been fed for years on that victimhood discourse and its distorted historical associations. It does not matter if it is true or not, as long as people want to believe it is.

3- Their fight is not only against the Spanish and the Chinese states, but against part of their own fellow citizens who do not share their ideals, goals, or means. The vertical antagonism between an underdog and the state elites is facilitated by a prior horizontal antagonism—nationalist, ethnic—based on hatred towards the “other” (Spanish and Chinese), which is considered a threat to “us”. The growing fanaticism and disrespect for this other social groups entails a mounting spiral of silence and dehumanization of all those Catalans and Hong Kong people who identify themselves as partially or totally Spanish or Chinese. Or with those who simply do not wish to join the movements for ideological reasons beyond identity. Thus, many Hong Kong people who manifest themselves as pro-Chinese, or simply those who make the mistake of speaking Mandarin instead of Cantonese or English, are more and more commonly labelled as traitors, sometimes are censored, insulted, and even attacked. Same occurs with those Catalans who are opposed to secession and defend their right to remain Spanish and Catalan at the same time, or those who criticize the approach taken by the secessionist movement in the last two or three years. The Catalan independence movement didn't ever enjoy the support of at least half the Catalans in any democratic elections until now, but their purportedly democratic logic, which is indeed only a populist and nationalist one, does not understand the diversity of opinions and tried to impose their secessionist project going over the law and the respect to the rest of the society. The serious risk that entail both the dichotomous vision of the world between “us” and “them”, and the increasing social polarization based on ethnic identities, is its proximity to the most retrograde and violent nationalist outbursts. Because the exaltation of the supremacy of the own nation, as opposed to that of the Chinese or the Spaniards, provokes an identical reaction with opposite direction from those who suddenly feel the need to defend the Chinese and Spanish reactionary nationalisms. Proof of it has been the emergence of the far-right party VOX, entering the Spanish lower house and many local governments for the first time since the end of the dictatorship in 1978. Chinese nationalism and hatred against Hong Kong is no wonder also growing.

4- It is equally important to mention that in both movements violence has been exercised only by small groups, mainly anti-system/anti-establishment, largely formed by young people. These young people, feeling they are leading an historical moment for their nation, are also the most desperate about the negative future our societies face, and the more easily influenced by the antagonistic discourse and the hatred speech. On many occasions, the activists engaging in violence against the police do not have even reached the age of majority. They have opted for violence as a method of struggle opposed to the peaceful protests carried out by the majority of the supporters of the movements. However, the soft condemnations of this violence by the majorities in these movements coexist with a hypocritical condemnation of police repression and its alleged excesses. Paradoxically, these young activists have exerted violence against what they call the repressive police of the state, which is neither Chinese nor Spanish, but primarily Hong Konger and Catalan, and against the public infrastructure of Catalonia and Hong Kong, which is paid by their own communities. In the beginning of this article I already exposed the whitewashing of violent actions by certain socio-political actors from Catalonia and Hong Kong, considering violence as a valid means to an end. The great danger of these narratives, together with those of hatred against the different other and the progressive polarization between the social groups within Catalonia and Hong Kong, is that it becomes more and more probable that these violent minority groups end up imposing their strategies in the core of the movements, displacing the moderate voices, accusing them of being weak, cowards, or directly treacherous. The use of violence as a tactic to make the conflict visible internationally requires the conscious search for shocking images of state repression and, therefore, needs increasing provocations until these images of force majeure appear. As the young Hong Konger that was shot by a policeman said, if he had been shot in the head and killed, it would have been a good thing because that could increase society's awareness. Ideally, the search for a dead man, a martyr that makes the passions explode and touches the sensibilities of the international community, supposes a double-edged sword : by increasing the hatred towards the “other”—describing it as antidemocratic and fascist, as an oppressor, in short, dehumanizing it—this escalating violence can bring and, in fact, already brought, seriously injured people in both sides, the protesters and the policemen who risk their lives to do their job. In Catalonia, the same pro-independence government that encouraged mass mobilization, then had to order its own regional police, formed by Catalan people, to suppress the protests, showing a total lack of criteria and institutional responsibility. Afterwards, the government reluctantly condemned violence “on all sides”, focusing not so much in those who throw Molotov cocktails at the police and send a policeman to the hospital seriously injured after breaking his hull with a cobblestone, but on the alleged excessive use of the force of those riot police that subsequently acted against the violent activists as a part of their dangerous job. Something similar has occurred in Hong Kong, as if those masked people that hit policemen with iron bars attempting to cause them the maximum physical damage, had the right to do so without consequences or response from those whose life they are putting at risk. Policemen, we have to remind, who are also from Hong Kong. Members of the Hong Kong movement and large sectors of the international press have interpreted all police actions as an example of Chinese dictatorial repression, which is an exercise in hypocrisy that forgets the basic role of police in all states, democratic or not. Therefore, with the nationalist hatred speech running wild and the violence sought as the only way to find a solution to the unsolvable conflicts that I believe Hong Kong and Catalonia are facing at this very stage, it is not possible to know if in the end the martyrs will come from the side of the purportedly suppressed people or from the side of the police repressors.

Finally, once settled the main similarities, it is time to return to the opposite political nature of Spain and China, which is the main difference between the cases of Catalonia and Hong Kong. When some actors in the Hong Kong movement voluntarily associate themselves with that of Catalonia, in solidarity as brothers fighting against “oppression”, we could easily infer that for those Hong Kongers democracy is not what truly moves them. Because if that was the goal, they should be happy to be a highly autonomous region like Catalonia is within a full-fledged democracy as Spain, enjoying all the rights to protect and promote their own culture and language, and all the freedoms that any liberal democratic state could wish to have. Even to the point of having the right to pursue independence by legal and constitutional means and from the Catalan autonomous government democratically elected. On the contrary, when some factions of the Hong Kong movement support the Catalan movement as a “struggle against oppression”, what they are supporting is the approach of the Catalan pro-independence faction that employs exclusionary discourses and anti-democratic actions as a tool for keeping their privileges, and the minority who believes in violence as the only way ahead. For these Hong Kongers, in the case China was a full-fledged democracy they would still maintain the same sort of discourses, as Catalan pro-independence do. It does not matter the political nature of the parent state, because it is not a debate about democracy but about national—ethnic—sovereignty. In Catalonia, legitimate state repression has been only exerted on those representatives who pursued their individual goals in open violation of the constitution and the rule-of-law, or those activists who employed violence to attack and destroy. We should be aware of the groups mobilized by hatred and fanaticism, those who feel scared of a not very promising economic future, threatened by the presence of an inferior “other” that jeopardizes the moral and economic superiority of the real “people” of Hong Kong and Catalonia. In short, those who show a supremacist germ camouflaged in the shape of a misleading popular (populist) democratic endorsement in which a dominant group intends to impose their identity and their political will on the whole of the citizenship. They are creators of borders and perpetuators of inequalities who, on the other hand, show only the natural selfishness inherent in human beings.

But despite this harsh critique, I understand, endorse and support the protests in Catalonia and Hong Kong when it comes from the real underdogs and when it is directed against the real culprits : no China and Spain, but the neoliberal system that the bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Catalonia—among many other places—have been feeding during decades, subjecting a social majority to the economic power of a few, contributing to the breakdown of liberal democracy and underpinning injustices. That neoliberal system is the one that ignites the fanaticism of poor devils who do not know how to constructively direct their desire for change against the right enemy, and end up following the dictates of a bourgeoisie that utilising a supremacist discourse pretends to protect or increase their own power. Hopefully, in Catalonia and Hong Kong, two exemplary regions until recent times, people will rediscover what the real struggle should be, dismiss violence as a viable mean to their goals, forget ethnic factors as a reason to break apart with the different “other”, and become the spearhead of the global battle against cannibal neoliberalism rather than the perfect example for the advocates of the destruction of liberal democracy and the success of nationalist exclusionary discourses.